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Abstract 
The development of transportation infrastructure, including airports, plays a vital role in 
economic growth in emerging markets. However, government budget allocations for this 
purpose are often insufficient to realise the full benefits. Project finance and Public Private 
Partnerships (PPPs) in particular, have been used to enable private sector participation in 
the financing of airport development. Airports PPPs have successfully been implemented 
worldwide, including, to a lesser extent, in emerging markets and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). 
There is a lack of literature on the benefits, risks, challenges and opportunities associated 
with airport PPPs in SSA, which this research aims to address. Case studies of recent airport 
PPPs in Brazil and India provide an outline of the emerging market context and insight into 
factors that affected these airport PPPs. In-depth interviews with two representatives of 
governments in SSA provide a rich view on the perceived benefits, risks, challenges and 
opportunities associated with airport PPPs in Africa. 
This research has found that airport PPPs can contribute to airport developments in SSA by 
enabling the private funding of airport upgrades and expansions. However, governments 
have an important role to play in providing an enabling environment for private investors by 
improving investability and implementing clear and practical PPP legislation, aviation 
policies and economic regulation of airport services. The limited institutional capacity and 
domain expertise of SSA governments is perceived as a challenge to the implementation of 
airport PPPs in the region. The low level of air traffic and small number of airports that 
handle more than one million passengers per annum further limit the opportunities for 
airport PPPs in SSA, although strong GDP growth provides an encouraging sign.  
Successful airport PPPs require the participation of private consortia with expertise in 
airport operations, construction and infrastructure concessions. Financing of airport PPPs is 
done preferably from domestic sources and development finance can play an important 
role. There are risks associated with the foreign ownership of key national infrastructure 
and a reliance on private sector to provide public infrastructure. Lighter forms of PPPs that 
limit the private sector risk exposure may be more suitable to the low-traffic and high-risk 
environment in SSA.   
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1. Introduction and Motivation 
Even though Africa is the second most populous continent with approximately 1.1 billion 
people, or 15% of the world total (UN, 2012), it accounts for only around 3% of global air 
passenger traffic, measured in revenue passenger-kilometres (RPK) (IATA, 2012; Airbus, 
2012). The propensity to fly of the African population is by far the lowest in the world, at an 
average of 0.06 trips per capita in 2013 (Airbus, 2014). However, this is set to change; with 
economic growth and increasing urbanisation, air traffic to and from Africa, as well as within 
the continent, is expected to rise. The International Air Transport Association (IATA) expects 
passenger traffic in Africa to grow on average by 4.7% per annum, reaching a total of 294 
million passengers by 2034, compared to global annual average growth of 4.1% (IATA, 
2014). The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) is even more optimistic, 
predicting an average annual growth rate for Africa of 7.2% from 2012 to 2032, with intra-
African passenger traffic growing at 9.4% over the same period (ICAO, 2013a). 
Table 1-1: Global air passenger traffic distribution and propensity to fly (from: Airbus, 2012 and 2014) 
Region Percentage of world passenger traffic 
(RPK) 
Propensity to fly (Average trips 
originating in the area, per capita) 
2012 2032 forecast 2013 2033 forecast 
Africa 3% 3% 0.06 0.13 
Asia/Pacific 29% 34% 0.24 0.69 
CIS 1 4% 4% 0.25 0.76 
Europe 26% 22% 0.99 1.87 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 
5% 7% 0.36 0.87 
Middle East 8% 12% 0.38 0.92 
North America 25% 18% 1.59 2.14 
1
 CIS stands for Commonwealth of Independent States, a regional organisation of former Soviet Republics 
For the projected growth to be realised there are several challenges to be addressed. Not 
least are the prevalence of peace, political stability and the sustainable growth of economic 
activity and welfare that are paramount to increased demand for air travel. The regulatory 
environment is a particularly important factor to be considered; notably the regulation of air 
space. Research by InterVISTAS for IATA has estimated the potential benefits of liberalising 
African airspace, affording foreign airlines rights to operate freely in the region (InterVISTAS, 
2014). According to this study benefits of ‘open skies’ policies include increased air 
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transport activity, which leads to an uptick in tourism, trade, investment and productivity, 
and ultimately generates employment and economic output. Furthermore, growth in air 
traffic can only be realised if there is sufficient capacity and adequate quality of 
infrastructure. According to Hussain (2010), air transport infrastructure consists of “airports, 
air traffic control (ATC) centers, and the organizations involved in coordinating their 
provision and use” (p. 5).  
This research focuses on financing the development of airport infrastructure that is required 
to facilitate growth of air transport in Africa. In order to motivate the study we take a 
further look into the state of airport infrastructure in Africa, means of financing necessary 
investment and the role of Public Private Partnerships. 
1.1. Airports in Africa 
As mentioned earlier, the level of air transportation in Africa is low compared to other 
regions of the world. Globally, airports generated an income of US$ 117 billion, of which 
African airports raked in a mere US$ 2.8 billion or 2.4% (ACI, 2013). Typically, only airports 
that handled more than 1 million annual passengers (MAP) are considered viable (Foster & 
Briceño-Garmendia, 2010; ICAO, 2013b), although some argue the more than 3 to 5 MAP 
are required to generate acceptable returns (Aviation Economics, 2013). Smaller airports do 
not generate sufficient income to cover the relatively high fixed costs associated with 
operating an airport. The Airports Council International (ACI), an international industry 
body, estimates that over two-thirds of the world’s airports are loss-making (ICAO, 2013b). 
According to research by the Centre for Aviation (2014a) African airports perform relatively 
well in terms of gross profit, income per passenger and liquidity (current ratio) compared to 
other regions. However, they are lacking in terms of revenue generated from sources other 
than landing fees and passenger charges, the so-called non-aeronautical revenues.  
According to Foster & Briceño-Garmendia (2010) and Gwilliam (2011), there are almost 
3000 airports in Africa, of which around 260 received scheduled services in 2007. According 
to airport traffic statistics published by the ACI, in 2014 there were 36 airports in Africa with 
over 1 MAP, 21 of which are located in SSA (ACI, 2015); these airports are listed in Table 1-2. 
Broadly speaking they can be divided into the following categories: 
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 Mega airports: >10 MAP  
There are only two mega airports in Africa, located on either end of the continent 
(North/South), in Cairo, Egypt and in Johannesburg, South Africa. 
 Large airports: >5 MAP  
Nine airports in Africa can be classed as medium size based on passenger traffic 
between 5 and 10 MAP. Five of these airports are located in North Africa (Morocco, 
Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia) and the others are spread across SSA.  
 Medium airports: >1 MAP  
Twenty-one airports in Africa handled between 1 and 5 MAP in 2014, fourteen of 
which are located in SSA.  
 Small airports: <1 MAP (not listed in Table 1-2)  
The majority of airports are small airports, often only handling domestic flights. 
Typically, they are considered non-viable and their operations have to be subsidised.  
According to Foster & Briceño-Garmendia (2010) and Gwilliam (2011) the number of 
airports in Africa is stable and there is generally sufficient runway capacity available. One 
runway can provide a capacity of over 10 MAP, and those airports that currently handle 
more than 10 MAP already have two runways. However, the runways are not always in good 
condition, due to lacking maintenance. Less than half of all runways in SSA are in excellent 
or very good condition, compared to over 95 percent in North Africa (Foster & Briceño-
Garmendia, 2010). This is problematic because under-maintenance of infrastructure causes 
African countries to spend more than they should on maintaining a stable level of 
infrastructure (Briceño-Garmendia, Smits & Foster, 2008). The cost of preventive 
maintenance is lower than the net present outflows of major rehabilitations.  
The number of runways is currently not a limiting factor for growth of air transport in Africa. 
Where needed, runway capacity can be increased by lengthening and widening runways, by 
improvements in operational procedures, or by constructing (partial) parallel taxiways that 
allow runways to be used more efficiently (Gwilliam, 2011). Furthermore, Foster & Briceño-
Garmendia (2010) state that many Sub-Saharan African terminal buildings handle traffic 
volumes at or above their stated capacity. New terminal buildings, or expansions of existing 
terminal buildings, are required to facilitate growth in air transport, although data on 
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terminal buildings is not readily available. Moreover, as anyone who has flown to several 
African countries can confirm, many terminal buildings could do with upgrades to improve 
the quality of service.  
According to the World Bank (CBC, 2013) increasing urbanisation and economic growth in 
Africa require the transport sector to invest in order to provide strong international 
connections that ensure effective supply chains and provide domestic industries with a 
competitive advantage. Given the low levels of air traffic and airport activity in Sub-Saharan 
Africa there are significant opportunities for growth, provided the enabling infrastructure is 
available in sufficient capacity and adequate quality. According to ICAO (2013b) current and 
forecast air traffic will necessitate increasing levels of investment in order “to maintain and 
enhance airport capacity and service quality” (p. 3).  
Research by Banerjee, Oetzel & Ranganathan (2006), shows that in most emerging market 
economies the government is not able to finance the growing need for infrastructure. Foster 
and Briceño-Garmendia (2010) argue that income generated from airports and air traffic 
should be sufficient to finance the necessary investments, but that the sector does not 
capture this income due to political and organisational issues.  
This then begs the question of how the necessary investments in airport infrastructure can 
be financed. 
Table 1-2: Passenger traffic at the largest airports in Africa in 2014 (from: ACI, 2015) 
Rank City Country IATA Code Million Annual 
Passengers (MAP) 
% change 
2013 – 2014 
1 Johannesburg South Africa JNB 19.2 +1.3% 
2 Cairo Egypt CAI 14.7 +6.6% 
3 Cape Town South Africa CPT 8.6 +3.4% 
4 Casablanca Morocco CMN 8.0 +5.4% 
5 Lagos Nigeria LOS 7.5 +7.2% 
6 Hurghada Egypt HRG 7.2 +24.9% 
7 Addis Ababa Ethiopia ADD 6.9 +5.6% 
8 Algiers Algeria ALG 6.5 +9.1% 
9 Nairobi Kenya NBO 6.4 +7.4% 
10 Sharm El Sheikh Egypt SSH 6.2 +4.8% 
11 Tunis Tunisia TUN 5.1 -5.1% 
12 Abuja Nigeria ABV 4.6 +18.2% 
13 Durban South Africa DUR 4.5 -0.2% 
14 Marrakech Morocco RAK 4.0 +5.4% 
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15 Khartoum Sudan KRT 2.8 +9.4% 
16 Plaine Magnien Mauritius MRU 2.8 +1.3% 
17 Accra Ghana ACC 2.5 -2.2% 
18 Borg El Arab Egypt HBE 2.5 +11.1% 
19 Dar Es Salaam Tanzania DAR 2.5 +5.5% 
20 Enfidha Tunisia NBE 2.2 -2.6% 
21 Saint-Denis La Reunion RUN 2.0 +0.6% 
22 Djerba Tunisia DJE 2.0 +4.0% 
23 Tripoli Libya TIP 1.9 -46.3% 
24 Dakar Senegal DKR 1.8 -1.6% 
25 Oran Algeria ORN 1.6 +14.2% 
26 Agadir Morocco AGA 1.5 -0.8% 
27 Entebbe Uganda EBB 1.4 -1.0% 
28 Mombasa Kenya MBA 1.4 +6.8% 
29 Port Harcourt Nigeria PHC 1.3 +13.4% 
30 Brazzaville Congo BZV 1.3 +15.2% 
31 Port Elizabeth South Africa PLZ 1.3 +1.1% 
32 Abidjan Cote D'Ivoire ABJ 1.3 +7.6% 
33 Marsa Alam Egypt RMF 1.2 +26.9% 
34 Monastir Tunisia MIR 1.1 -4.3% 
35 Lusaka Zambia LUN 1.1 +1.5% 
36 Pointe Noire Congo PNR 1.1 +14.7% 
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2. Problem Statement 
It is clear that airport infrastructure and airport business activity in Sub-Saharan Africa is 
lagging behind the rest of the world, and with it the air transport activity it enables. Air 
transport has been shown to have a positive relation with economic development, both in 
Africa and other regions of the world, and therefore a lack of availability and quality of 
airport infrastructure may hurt economic development (Button & Taylor, 2000; Brueckner, 
2003; Cooper & Smith, 2005; Green, 2007; Ishutkina & Hansman, 2009; Khadaroo & 
Seetanah, 2008; Bilotkach, 2015). It is thus in the interest of governments in Sub-Saharan 
Africa to further the development of airports. 
However, many governments are not able to finance the required investments in airport 
infrastructure from fiscal revenues alone and it has been recognised that private 
participation is required. Project finance, and public private partnerships (PPP) in particular, 
may offer valuable opportunities for the private sector to become involved in the 
development of airport infrastructure. There are limited examples of airport PPPs in 
emerging markets and only very few in Africa. Most of these examples are relatively recent 
and have not been studied extensively in an effort to draw valuable and reliable insights 
from them. 
The literature on the topic is focused very much on the European, Australasian and 
(Southeast) Asian markets, where airport PPP activity has been greater. Research conducted 
does not address the specific issues that may be encountered in emerging and low-income 
countries. Such issues include relatively low levels of GDP, and corresponding low demand 
for air travel, high airport landing charges (Gwilliam, 2011) and limited competition amongst 
airports in certain regions. Consequently, research to date does not offer insights into the 
particular set of challenges faced in airport PPPs in SSA, let alone propose solutions to deal 
with them.  
Developing airports in Africa is a large and complex undertaking that will require the 
mobilisation of different sources of capital and expertise through a variety of project 
structures, and financial instruments and markets. More guidance would be welcome to 
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assist African governments in developing airport infrastructure, and to private investors in 
realizing the opportunities available.  
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3. Research Objectives and Questions  
The objective of this study is to provide insight into the opportunities and limitations of PPPs 
for airport developments in Sub-Saharan Africa. It aims to provide guidance on the 
challenges and possible avenues for solutions that exist.  
We aim to achieve this objective by answering the main research question:  
Can Public Private Partnerships support the development of airports in SSA? 
This main research question has been broken down into three key questions, each 
supported by a number of sub-questions as follows: 
1. How can PPPs be used for airport development in emerging markets? 
1.1. Who are the key stakeholders in airport PPPs and what are their interests? 
1.2. What are possible PPP structures for airports? What are the key characteristics of 
airport PPP structures? 
1.3. What are the key benefits and risks associated with airport PPPs? 
 
2. What are the requirements for successful airport PPPs in SSA? 
2.1. What lessons can be learnt from past PPPs in emerging markets?  
2.2. What PPP structures are most suitable for airport development in SSA? 
2.3. What are the necessary preconditions for airports PPPs in SSA, and do those exist? 
2.4. What are the limitations to the use of PPPs for airports in SSA? 
 
3. Do governments in SSA consider PPPs as suitable options for airport development? 
3.1. What are governments’ motivations for using, or not using PPPs for airports? 
3.2. What are the objectives for governments in considering PPPs for airports? 
3.3. What are the challenges faced by governments in using PPPs for airports? 
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4. Benefits of the Research 
This study will provide African airport authorities/owners with the following benefits: 
 Lessons learnt from past airport PPPs, providing insight into the risks to 
governments, airlines and consumers. 
 Identification of financial considerations that determine the success of airport PPPs. 
 Guidance on the structuring of airport PPPs in various situations, dealing with 
challenges specific to emerging markets. 
 Ability to approach or engage with potential investors around a common 
understanding of risks and rewards. 
Private airport investors will find this study useful as it provides them with information on 
the opportunities that exist for airport PPPs in Sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, they will 
gain an understanding of the concerns and considerations of the public airport owners. This 
will be advantageous to them when identifying and structuring airport PPP deals.  
This study will provide both public and private parties with insights that are currently not 
available in the literature. It will enhance the understanding of both parties, which should 
contribute to increased chances of successful airport PPPs. This study will therefore further 
the interest of airport investment, which should enable growth in air traffic, along with the 
associated benefits to local and regional economies.  
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5. Literature Review 
5.1. Contribution of airports to economic development  
In order to fully appreciate the importance of investment in airport infrastructure in Africa, 
it is essential to understand the relationship between air transportation and economic 
growth, and more specifically between (air) transportation infrastructure and economic 
growth.  
There are several studies that evaluate the effects of infrastructure, which typically includes 
transportation, energy, telecommunications, water and sanitation, on various measures of 
economic output and growth. For instance, a time series analysis by Egert, Kozluk, & 
Sutherland (2009) found a positive impact of investment in infrastructure on economic 
growth in OECD countries. Mbekeani (2010) argues that the availability of infrastructure 
with sufficient capacity and of adequate quality, reduces the cost of doing business, which 
leads to increased competitiveness in international trade.  
When considering the positive effects found in various studies, it is important to note that 
such results are neither consistent, nor entirely certain. Ajakaiye & Ncube (2010) argue that 
the causal relationship between infrastructure and economic development is inconclusive. 
Calderon and Serven (2010) describe that much of the literature on the topic finds positive 
long-run effects of infrastructure on measures of economic development such as output and 
productivity, or their growth. However, they point out that inferences should be made with 
caution, due to the three common issues of measurement, heterogeneity and identification. 
Issues of measurement of infrastructure as a single variable, either physical or monetary, 
relate to the difficulty of capturing the multi-dimensional concept of infrastructure. 
Similarly, research on the topic often falls short in capturing the heterogeneity of 
infrastructure across time periods and countries, in terms of quality and productivity for 
instance, mostly due to a lack of data. Most importantly however, Calderon & Serven (2010) 
point out that research evaluating the linkages between infrastructure and economic 
development is problematic in terms of identification; there is a two-way causality between 
them. Countries with a higher or faster growing output may spend more on infrastructure 
and empirical research that does not control for this could display a simultaneity bias. 
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Research by Kumo (2012) using data from South Africa confirms there is a strong two-way 
causality between infrastructure investment and long term economic growth. Ajakaiye & 
Ncube (2010) conclude that sustained economic growth often occurs in the presence of 
“meaningful infrastructure development” (p. i4), but that it remains ambiguous which 
causes the other.  
Looking at transport infrastructure specifically, econometric research by Khadaroo & 
Seetanah (2008) has found a positive relationship between foreign direct investment and 
transport infrastructure, inclusive of air, land and water transport, for a panel of 20 African 
countries over the time period 1986-2000. Moreover, their results indicate that foreign 
investors are more sensitive to transport infrastructure than to other forms of 
infrastructure, such as communication, energy, wastewater and defence.  
A significant body of research has been developed that demonstrates the links between air 
transportation and economic growth (Button & Taylor, 2000; Brueckner, 2003; Cooper & 
Smith, 2005; Green, 2007; Ishutkina & Hansman, 2009; Bilotkach, 2015). Air transport 
activity generates income and jobs, in the aviation industry directly, and indirectly in 
supporting industries such as manufacturing, engineering and services, as well as in sectors 
that are supported by it, such as tourism. A case study of Amsterdam Schiphol Airport by 
Hakfoort, Poot & Rietveld (2001) estimated that one job on the airport generated 
approximately one job in “indirect or induced employment” (p. 595). Thus, airports 
generate substantial catalytic impacts, or wider economic benefits, which according to 
InterVISTAS (2014) manifest mainly through the following channels: 
 Trade – air transport enables and facilitates trade by increasing connections 
between places and reducing travel times, which brings new customers of goods and 
services within reach. Cargo transported by air often consists of high value products, 
including time-sensitive goods and perishables. This is illustrated by the fact that 
while air cargo only accounts for 0.5% of global trade volumes, it accounts for 35% 
by value (ATAG, 2015). Research by Nordas & Piermartini (2004) affirms that the 
quality of infrastructure is a key factor influencing bilateral trade flows.  
 Investment – location decisions by companies tend to take into account proximity to 
transport nodes, as they provide competitive benefits. The connectivity provided by 
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an airport can attract new businesses to its area. For instance, Bel & Fageda (2008) 
found that the availability of direct flights from a nearby airport is an important 
factor in determining a company’s headquarter location.  
 Productivity – Cooper & Smit (2005) found that the catalytic impact of air transport 
in Europe “has been to raise both investment and underlying productivity 
significantly” (p. vi). Underlying productivity is a measure of the increase in GDP over 
and above the increase caused by changes in inputs of labour and capital. They argue 
that improved air transport provides firms with access to new markets (improving 
supply side performance) and to a larger labour pool, allowing them to attract and 
retain high quality employees. These effects, combined with greater exposure to 
international competition, have encouraged firms’ innovation and efficiency.  
Research clearly demonstrates that transportation infrastructure, specifically airports, and 
the air transportation they enable, contribute to economic growth and development. This 
means it is in the interest of African governments to ensure sufficient investment in airport 
infrastructure in order to enable and support growth.  
5.2. Investment in infrastructure and project finance 
Briceño-Garmendia et al (2008) state that the public sector is responsible for the majority of 
investments in infrastructure in Africa. Their research shows that African governments 
typically make budgetary provisions for investment in infrastructure equivalent to between 
6 and 12 per cent of their gross domestic product (GDP). However, because most African 
economies are small, this level of spending is not big in absolute terms. Governments’ 
budgetary provisions are funded through fiscal revenues, government borrowings or grants. 
Governments can borrow from national or international capital markets, directly from other 
governments or from international institutions.  
It has been recognised that governments of low-income countries and emerging markets 
have not been able to address the need for investments in infrastructure utilising the 
traditional forms of budget finance (Banerjee, Oetzel & Ranganathan, 2006; Brixiova, 
Mutambatsere, Ambert & Etienne, 2011). Several studies suggest that due to public sector 
budget constraints and low savings levels in Africa, foreign private capital is required to fund 
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the necessary infrastructure development (Ramamurtia & Doh, 2004; Orr & Kennedy, 2008; 
Ajakaiye & Ncube, 2010). Mezui & Hundal (2013) suggest broad initiatives for cooperation 
between the public and private sectors as the way forward. Brealey, Cooper & Habib (1996) 
describe various ways for governments to involve the private sector in the financing and 
management of infrastructure projects, which are summarised in Table 5-1. They define 
privatization as the provision by private parties of “capital and management services to an 
entire industry, rather than to individual projects” (p. 27). Private funding and management 
of individual projects are achieved through project finance. It should be noted that others 
define privatization more generically as the transfer of governmental functions, 
responsibilities, control or ownership to the private sector (TRB, 2012). 
Orr & Kennedy (2008) argue that risk reduction through project finance, securitization of 
project loans and consortium finance were drivers of the boom in foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in infrastructure in developing countries in the 1990s. Esty (2003) states that project 
finance is one of the most important means of funding infrastructure projects and its 
application in developing countries is likely to increase.  
Table 5-1: Ways that infrastructure projects can be funded and managed (from: Brealey, Cooper and Habib, 1996) 
Arrangement Finance Management 
Project finance Private Private 
Privatization Private Private 
Service contracts Government Private  
Leases Private Government 
Nationalization Government Government 
 
Project finance is a financing structure that is often used to finance large, capital intensive 
projects, “characterized by a system of support and risk mitigation mechanisms that address 
certain key risks that otherwise could not be financed on a stand-alone basis” (Mezui & 
Hundal, 2013, p.45). It involves the creation of a legally independent special purpose vehicle 
(SPV), financed with non-recourse debt, that is used to invest in an asset, or assets, with a 
single purpose and limited life (Esty, 2003). Brealey et al (1996, p. 25) give the following 
principal features of large infrastructure projects funded through project finance: 
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 A project is established as a separate company, which operates under a concession 
obtained from the host government. 
 A major proportion of the equity of the project company is provided by the project 
manager or sponsor, thereby tying the provision of finance to the management of 
the project. 
 The project company enters into comprehensive contractual arrangements with 
suppliers and customers. 
 The project company operates with a high ratio of debt to equity, with lenders 
having only limited recourse to the government or to the equity-holders in the event 
of default. 
Just like other companies, the performance of the project company is dependent on its 
ability to attract paying customers. However, infrastructure projects are often supported by 
government-linked off-take guarantees or minimum revenue guarantees (Mezui & Hundal, 
2013). This form of risk management and the use of limited- or non-recourse debt mean 
that for (foreign) equity investors a small amount of capital can go a long way, without 
exposing them to unacceptably high levels of risk. This leads to the observation by Brealey 
et al (1996) that project finance is more likely in capital-intensive projects in riskier-than-
average countries, such as the emerging markets of Africa. Indeed, Esty (2003) argues that 
by isolating the project in a separate company, project finance reduces the possibility that a 
risky asset has a negative impact on the equity investor, or sponsoring firm. Further, he 
argues that using project finance can reduce agency costs associated with capital projects 
with large free cash flows, and “solves leverage-induced underinvestment by allocating 
project returns to new capital providers in a way that cannot be replicated using corporate 
debt” (p. 4). 
The structuring of a typical project financing arrangement for infrastructure involves 
numerous parties, as shown in Figure 5-1, chief of which are the following: 
 Government provides the SPV with a (long-term) concession to build and operate 
the infrastructure involved. The SPV may retain ownership of the asset, or transfer it 
to the government at the end of the concession. Government may hold equity in the 
SPV, provide debt guarantees to lenders, or provide off-take guarantees and 
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subsidies. Government also provides the necessary regulatory framework, licensing 
and permitting.  
 Sponsors or equity investors provide the capital required for establishment of the 
SPV and the construction of the asset. According to Mezui & Hundal (2013), this 
amounts to 20 – 40% of the capital required. Typically, a single sponsor owns a 
controlling stake in the SPV and is involved with the construction and/or 
management of the project.  
 Debt investors typically provide 60 – 80% of the capital required for the project 
(Menzui & Hundal, 2013). Often this debt is provided by a syndicate of lenders, such 
as banks, specialised institutions or the bond market. As the risk profile of the 
project changes throughout the duration of the concession agreement the debt may 
be renegotiated.  
 Contractors and suppliers are involved in the construction of the project and 
provision of the necessary inputs. The main contractor often holds a controlling 
stake as (one of) the sponsor(s) of the SPV (Brealey et al, 1996).  
 Customers or off-takers can be one or more government agencies, corporate firms 
or individual end users.  
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Figure 5-1: Typical project finance structure (adapted from: Mezui & Hundal, 2013 and Brealey et al, 1996) 
 
Possible sources of private (debt) capital for project financing include following: 
 Commercial banks 
 Export Credit Agencies 
 International Financing Institutions (including grants) 
 International capital markets (including project bonds) 
 Domestic capital markets (including project bonds) 
Brealey et al (1996) describe the multitude of contracts between the various parties 
involved in a project finance arrangement as means of risk management, intended to 
allocate the risks to those parties best able to evaluate and manage them. Ramamurtia & 
Doh (2004) note that a key incentive for equity investors backing infrastructure projects was 
the possibility for them or their sister companies to sell products and services to the project 
under beneficial contractual terms.  
As governments seek to involve the private sector more in infrastructure development using 
project finance, the procurement model known as public private partnership (PPP) is often 
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mentioned. The World Bank (2014) and European Investment Bank (2015a) state that most 
PPP projects are financed using project finance.  
5.3. Public Private Partnerships 
A number of definitions of public private partnerships (PPPs) are being used in the literature 
and practice and variations depend on the academic or regulatory context in which they are 
used. Broadly speaking PPP refers to private sector involvement in realising public works 
and PPPs generally fill a gap between traditional procurement of government projects and 
full privatization (Grimsey & Lewis, 2005). Grimsey & Lewis (2005) argue that PPPs differ 
from privatization in the sense that the government no longer has a direct role in the 
operation of a privatized asset, but maintains ultimate responsibility in the case of a PPP. 
Most definitions of public private partnerships refer to collaboration between public and 
private sector parties on a medium- to long-term basis, involving the provision of services 
and capital for the design, construction, management, operation and/or ownership of 
physical assets, and utilizing contractual methods of sharing risks and rewards between the 
various parties (Grimsey & Lewis, 2005; Yescombe, 2007; Chan et al, 2009; World Bank, 
2009; TRB, 2012).  
PPPs can involve a wide range of contracts from short-term to long-term, from provision of 
limited services, to complete financing, construction and operation of major (infrastructure) 
assets. According to the World Bank report Attracting Investors to African Public-Private 
Partnerships (2009, p. 8), the provision of public infrastructure by a private party under a 
long-term PPP arrangement typically involves the following: 
 Design and build or upgrade the public sector infrastructure 
 Assume substantial financial, technical, and operational risks 
 Receive a financial return through payments over the life of the contract from users, 
from the public sector, or from a combination of the two 
 Return the infrastructure to public sector ownership at the end of the contract (in 
some cases the private party may retain ownership of the asset). 
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Chan et al (2009) and the World Bank (2009) state that PPP schemes often use contract 
types such as the following, or variations thereof:  
 Design Build (D&B)  
 Operate Maintain (O&M)  
 Design Build Operate (DBO)  
 Build Own Operate Transfer (BOOT) 
 Build Own Operate (BOO) 
 Lease Own Operate (LOO) 
While PPPs are used in a wide range of industries, each with their own particular issues, the 
basic concepts and contract forms are applicable to a variety of infrastructure projects. 
Projects can involve the provision of infrastructure products/services directly to a 
government agency, or to the general public.  
According to Grimsey & Lewis (2005) the key objective of the public sector for using PPP 
arrangements is to achieve greater value for money. This would suggest the private sector 
may be more efficient at delivering the range of “infrastructure services” (p. 174) bundled 
together in a PPP, than the public sector is at procuring them separately. They argue that 
this is mainly due to “economic signals” (p. 172) that affect the private sector, but the public 
sector is removed from (Grimsey & Lewis, 2007). For instance, the use of project finance 
creates an incentive to ensure the PPP project is delivered on time as the cash flows 
generated from operating the project are the main, or only, source for repaying debt 
(Grimsey & Lewis, 2005). However, Chan et al (2009) argue that the extent to which PPPs 
provide value for money is not conclusive, as the outcomes under alternative arrangements 
are always unknown.  
Yescombe (2007) and Chan et al (2009) argue that the main motive for governments using 
PPPs for infrastructure development is that it can support increased investment without 
raising government borrowing. This is important for low income and emerging countries as 
PPPs can advance infrastructure projects “when governments face fiscal constraints that 
would prevent the use of traditional government procurement methods” (Chan et al, 2009, 
p. 173). Estache (2001) supports this by arguing that fiscal crisis was the main reason for 
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governments in the 1990s to turn to the private sector for infrastructure development. 
Yescombe (2007) points out that PPPs are additional to other forms of public sector 
investment and not in substitution for it, effectively enabling the public sector to make (or 
bring forward) investments in infrastructure that otherwise would not have been possible 
(or would have to be carried out later). 
Besides the greater efficiency and access to private capital, the World Bank (2009) argues 
that PPPs also create long-term mutuality of interests of public and private parties, moving 
away from short-term “claims culture” (p. 3) sometimes associated with traditional public 
procurement. Yescombe (2007) supports this by arguing the capital at risk provides a 
financial incentive to the private parties to ensure the project operates as required. Finally, 
the long-term nature of PPP projects requires thorough evaluation in project selection, 
which leads to more efficient use of resources (World Bank, 2009). This last motivation of 
PPPs is supported by Orr & Kennedy (2008), who implore private parties to “maintain 
commercial discipline in the selection of projects and ensure that marginal projects not go 
forward in times of booming economic activity” (p. 121). 
Grimsey & Lewis (2007), Yescombe (2007) and Chan et al (2009) describe several 
contentious issues raised by opponents of the use of PPP procurement methods, including 
the following:  
 The cost of finance for private parties can be expected to be higher than for 
governments. However, the cost of finance raised by private parties for a particular 
PPP infrastructure project reflects the level of risk of that project. The cost of finance 
for government often does not include this specific risk premium and can therefore 
not be compared on a like-for-like basis. 
 There may be concerns that the returns the private sector expects to earn for 
bearing the project risks are excessive, thus increasing the costs of provision of the 
infrastructure. However, it has been shown that the excess return to investors, 
compared to a competitive bidding market, is at most around 0.7 per cent. Further 
excess returns may be achieved by refinancing debt following good performance or 
risk reduction. It is suggested that such excess returns may be shared with 
governments through revenue-sharing agreements. 
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 Concerns are expressed about community access and user charges for the 
infrastructure provided under the PPP arrangement. User charges and tariffs can be 
addressed in the PPP contract and in regulation of the particular industry or type of 
infrastructure.  
As we move on to look at the use of PPPs for airport projects some of the issues, 
motivations and concerns mentioned above will be addressed more specifically.  
5.4. Airport Business  
In order to evaluate the role of public private partnerships in airport development it is 
important to understand the business of airports and typical ownership and operation 
models. 
Historically, most airports around the world were owned and managed by the state or a 
local government. However, in the 1990s the role of government in the provision of public 
infrastructure, including airports, started to shift from owner to regulator and policymaker 
(Juan, 1996; Tretheway, 2001; Oum, Zhang & Zhang, 2004; Czerny & Zhang, 2015). Several 
countries started to privatize or corporatize their airports, transferring complete or partial 
ownership, as well as management responsibilities to private firms. In Africa, most airports 
are still government owned and operated (Gwilliam, 2011).  
Several models of airport operation and ownership are used around the world, ranging from 
state owned and operated, to fully private. Broadly speaking the models can be divided into 
the following four distinct groupings: (i) public ownership and operation, (ii) regional 
ownership and operation, (iii) public ownership and private operation, and (iv) private 
ownership and operation (Tretheway, 2001; Gwilliam, 2011). Airport companies, whether 
publicly or privately owned, or a combination thereof, can own and/or manage one or more 
airports. Several large airports companies (e.g. British Airports Authority, Schiphol Group, 
Fraport and Airports Company South Africa) have stakes in airports in several countries, 
ranging from full airport ownership and operation in their home countries, to minority 
equity stakes, or limited management contracts at airports abroad. 
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The privatization and commercialization of airports, along with growing air traffic and 
general deregulation of air transport, has led to airports gradually evolving from simple 
providers of an infrastructure service, to complex, multifaceted businesses (Juan, 1996; 
Tretheway, 2001; Akwei, Tsamenyi & Sa’id, 2012). The core activities of an airport business 
are the provision of runways, taxiways, aircraft stands and security areas. These activities 
generate the so-called aeronautical revenues, through the collection of landing charges 
from aircraft operators (airlines) and passenger service charges. Non-core activities include 
ventures such as retail, property development, parking and other concessions. Income 
generated through these commercial activities is referred to as non-aeronautical revenue. 
The importance of non-aeronautical revenue for airport business is growing and already 
represents more than half of the total income, in most regions of the world (ACI, 2013). In 
this regard, African airports are lagging behind with non-core activities accounting for 
approximately one-third of total income. Non-aeronautical activities also tend to be more 
profitable than aeronautical operations (Oum, Zhang & Zhang, 2004). 
5.5. Airport PPPs 
As businesses with substantial fixed assets and multiple revenue streams, airports can be 
attractive to private investors. Given the multifaceted character of airport business, there 
are numerous ways of structuring airport PPPs. Private sector participation can range from 
service and management contracts, to long-term leases or even outright sale (see Table 
5-2). Airport PPPs can involve new ‘greenfield’ airport developments, or existing 
‘brownfield’ airports where the private party may be expected to carry out upgrades or 
expansions. Performance contracts are often used, specifying levels of performance that the 
private party must meet, including measures such as customer service, on-time flight 
departures, and environmental noise generation. PPP deals can cover a particular service or 
part of airport operations; they can be limited to a specific facility such as a terminal 
building, or cover the entire airport with all its facilities and services.  
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Table 5-2: Airport privatization continuum, generic models (from: TRB, 2012) 
Partial privatization 
Least privatization 
 
Service contracts 
↓ 
Management contracts 
↓ 
Developer financing and operation 
Full privatization 
↓ 
Long-term lease or sale 
↓ 
Private development 
Private airport ownership or development 
 
Most privatization 
 
Each of the models of privatization, or PPP structures, comes with different roles and 
responsibilities for the public sector and different arrangements for sharing of risks and 
rewards. According to Tretheway (2001) two key considerations for choosing airport PPP 
structures are the means by which the airport is expected to meet its financial 
requirements, and the degree of freedom in setting prices. As some airport services are 
inherently natural monopolies, economic regulation is particularly important in order to 
protect customers (i.e. the general public) from excessive prices (Tretheway, 2001; Oum, 
Zhang & Zhang, 2004; Czerny & Zhang, 2015). For instance, O’Donnell, Glennie, O’Keefe & 
Kwon (2011) argue that the lack of strict price regulation has allowed the privatized Sydney 
Airport in Australia “to use its market power to charge monopoly rents” (p. 176), leading to 
complaints by airlines, passengers and other airport users. 
There are four main types of regulation: (i) rate of return regulation, (ii) cost of services 
regulation, (iii) price cap regulation, and (iv) intervention regulation. The most direct and 
widely used way of regulating airport charges, for both aeronautical and non-aeronautical 
services, is price cap regulation (Tretheway 2001; Czerny & Zhang, 2015). Price cap 
regulation is very important to the structure and details of airport PPP deals, and is subject 
to intensive debate. The type of regulation chosen, and the price caps set, greatly affect an 
airport’s ability to generate financial returns, affects the costs of air travel to the general 
public, and may provide airports with incentives for innovation and development. According 
to Tretheway (2001), in most countries only aeronautical services are subject to price cap 
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regulation, as commercial non-aeronautical services are perceived to be offered in a more 
competitive market and therefore regulation is not required. The following three main 
versions of price cap regulation are in use at various airports around the world: 
 Single-till price cap – In this version of regulation both aeronautical revenues and 
non-aeronautical profits are used to cover the fixed costs of the airport’s 
aeronautical infrastructure, such as runways, taxiways and terminal buildings. The 
price cap for the airport’s aeronautical charges, i.e. the landing and passenger fees, 
is calculated by subtracting total operational costs, both aeronautical and non-
aeronautical, from the non-aeronautical revenues. The difference, or residual cost, is 
then covered by the aeronautical fees.  
 Dual-till (or multi-till) price cap – Under the dual- or multi-till approach the 
aeronautical costs are to be covered only by the aeronautical revenues. This may 
lead to higher landing and passenger fees, but can also incentivise airports to 
develop their commercial activities.  
 Hybrid-till price cap – This model is a combination of single- and dual-till approaches 
and allows for the price cap to be set such that the aeronautical costs are covered by 
aeronautical revenues plus a portion of non-aeronautical profits.  
Czerny & Zhang (2015) point out that airport market power, airline market power, airport 
congestion and the type of airport concession used are key factors to be considered in the 
evaluation of the various forms of price regulation for airports. Research has focused on 
determining the optimal pricing structure in order to maximize welfare for society as a 
whole, considering both the airports, airlines and their customers, i.e. the general public 
(Oum, Zhang & Zhang, 2004; Czerny, 2006; Czerny & Zhang, 2015). Their research has found 
that single-till regulation is beneficial when airports are not congested, by controlling airport 
market power. In the case of capacity-constrained airports dual-till regulation is preferred in 
order to control excessive congestion, which may lead to delays and lower levels of service. 
In addition, the extent of under-investment is lower under dual-till regulation, while total 
factor productivity is greater than under single-till regulation. Furthermore, they mention 
the auctioning and trading of slots, i.e. landing rights at the airport, can be used to control 
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the detrimental effect of too low aeronautical charges set under single-till regulation at 
congested airports.  
In order for airport PPPs to be successful and beneficial to all stakeholders, each airport 
must be considered in its own competitive landscape. Different forms of privatization, 
coupled with appropriate price regulation, are required for every different situation. 
Governments may have various reasons for considering airport PPPs, which typically include 
some of the following key motives (Tomová, 2009; Stiller, 2010; TRB, 2012, Rikhy, Roberts & 
Cheung, 2014, Özdemir, 2015): 
 Access to private capital for development 
 Extract an upfront or ongoing payment for the airport asset (monetize the asset) 
 Stimulate air service and airline competition, and meeting increased traffic demand 
 Introduce more innovation and creativity, including entrepreneurial ideas in the 
development of non-aeronautical revenue 
 Secure long-term efficiencies in operation and maintenance and enhance customer 
services 
 Transfer of technology and operational expertise 
 Internationalise airport business and involve global players 
 Shift the risk of debt, capital development and/or operations to the private sector 
 Accelerate project delivery and reduce construction costs 
 Reduce reliance on general tax levies 
 De-politicise airport decision making 
Airport PPPs are typically established through a competitive international bidding process, 
whereby the government invites bids from eligible and interested parties and awards a 
concession to the winning party. The winning party (the concessionaire) is then allowed by 
the government (the grantor) to operate the airport for a certain period of time and under 
certain conditions. These conditions often include required investments in capacity 
upgrades and financial structures under the applicable regulatory model.  
According to Rikhy et al (2014, p. 301) the majority of airport investors or operators have, 
until recently, been one of the following: 
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 Infrastructure fund investors with airports as part of a broader portfolio of 
infrastructure assets; 
 Concession companies with core construction businesses that have recently 
diversified into airports with limited airport operating experience, seeking to 
complement their core business; 
 Airport operators tied to a large, state-owned airport with limited flexibility and 
often limited resources (both financial and staff) spent on projects outside their 
home airports; or 
 Pure construction or development companies seeking to be the engineering, 
procurement and construction (EPC) contractor while remaining a shareholder 
during the development phase and exiting once the construction is finished. 
They point out that the involvement of EPC contractors has been more prevalent in the 
developing world due to the often large-scale developments of airport infrastructure and 
facilities tied to the airport PPPs. In recent years the following three new models for airport 
investment or ownership have emerged (Rikhy et al, 2014, p. 302): 
 Direct investment from institutions such as pension and sovereign wealth funds; 
 Cross-holdings or partnerships between existing airport operators; and 
 Investor-operator airport platforms. 
Due to the various objectives that may drive the grantor to embark on an airport PPP, and 
the complexity of the airport business, airport investors and operators with a wide range of 
capabilities and active involvement in the airport management are desirable (Feldman, 
2008; Rikhy et al, 2014). Feldman (2008) argues it is necessary to create a consortium or 
joint venture that brings together the right mix of operational expertise, local experience 
and capital.  
Governments around the world, including those in emerging markets, have decided that 
they can successfully involve the private sector in the financing and operation of airport 
infrastructure using PPPs (Magagi, 2011; ICAO, 2013b). For instance, there are 25 airport 
companies worldwide that are listed on stock exchanges; five being Chinese, three Mexican, 
two from Southeast Asia, and the remaining fifteen from Australasia and Europe (ICAO, 
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2013b). According to Magagi (2011) global investment in airport projects with private 
participation amounted to more than US$ 7 billion in 2006, and this reduced to just over 
US$ 2 billion in 2008. In the following years the investment activity remained around or 
below this level, until it shot up dramatically to around US$ 15 billion in 2012 mainly due to 
the closure of three large airport projects in Brazil (World Bank, 2013). The Private 
Participation in Infrastructure Database (World Bank, 2015a) shows total airport investment 
with private participation in Sub-Saharan Africa between 2004 and 2014 worth only US$ 
210m. Rikhy et al (2014) argue that airport privatization is a trend that is supported by an 
abundance of capital and investors having an increased understanding of value drivers for 
airports, having become more comfortable with demand risk and increasingly being able to 
adjust their returns for asset types and geographies.  
From the perspective of emerging markets Brazil and India are particularly interesting cases. 
Between 2011 and 2014, Brazil has privatized six of its major airports, under 20 to 30 year 
concession. The auctions of these PPP concessions were oversubscribed, including bids by 
local and global players, and prices were invariably higher than forecast. The Brazilian state 
airport operator Infraero retained a 49% equity stake in each of the concessions.  
India has also concluded PPP deals at six major airports since 2006, and further concessions 
are currently being considered. In its report on airport investments in Africa, the Centre for 
Aviation (2014a) argues that the Indian airport privatizations have become “a sort of role 
model for the developing world” (p. 3) and private investment in airport infrastructure in 
Africa is expected to follow this model. This model is characterised by the national 
government remaining the major investor in the PPP development, with a stake up to 50%, 
while private investors and operators take up stakes of around 10% each.  
In a description of the state of airport privatization around the world Tomová (2009) 
mentions there are thirteen PPP airports in Sub-Saharan Africa. The article, which may be 
slightly outdated by now, lists 4 airport PPPs in South Africa, and one each in the following 
countries: Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Nigeria, Tanzania 
and Togo. 
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5.6. Bankability of Airport PPPs in Sub-Saharan Africa 
The literature reviewed shows there are clear drivers for governments, particularly in 
emerging markets, to consider PPPs for airport development. There are numerous 
successful examples and plenty investor activity worldwide. However, airport PPP activity to 
date in Sub-Saharan Africa is very limited. One of the main reasons for this may be that 
airport PPP projects are often not considered bankable. 
A project is considered bankable if debt financiers, who typically provide the majority of 
capital, are willing to finance it (European Investment Bank, 2015b). In general terms, debt 
financiers will consider a project bankable if they believe the revenues generated by the 
project will be sufficient to pay back the loans and the risks involved with the project are 
acceptable. The concession grantor (i.e. the government) has various methods for 
enhancing a project’s bankability, which include the setting and structuring of concession 
fees and the protection of investors against specific risks (Stiller, 2010).  
Risks associated with PPP projects are numerous and Yescombe (2007, p. 242) divides them 
according to the project phases as follows: 
 general political risks  
 site-related risks  
 construction risks  
 completion risks  
 operation-phase risks  
He further describes that political risk is particularly important in PPP projects, as the one 
party in such a project, the government, “may be able to use its power to change the law, or 
take executive action, to the detriment of the Project Company” (p. 247). According to the 
report Attracting Investors to African public-private partnerships (World Bank, 2009) some 
of the major concerns of PPP equity and debt investors relate to the “effectiveness and 
enforceability of the PPP contract and related agreements” (p. 58-59). Research by Ojah, 
Gwatidzo and Kaniki (2010) indicated that support for property rights has a positive impact 
on the decisions to invest in fixed capital of firms in SSA, specifically in the East African 
Community. This shows that the rule of law in the project country, specifically the quality 
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and enforcement of property rights, can be a major determinant in the bankability of a 
project. More generally, the limited investability of emerging markets, due to what Ladekarl 
and Zervos have termed “housekeeping and plumbing” issues (Ladekarl & Zervos, 2004), is a 
factor that contributes to the low number of airport PPPs in SSA. 
Another factor that negatively affects the bankability of PPP projects in SSA is the limited 
availability of (long-term) debt funding. This, along with the opportunities to refinance debt, 
is also described as one of the major concerns of investors in African PPPs (World Bank, 
2009). Domestic financial markets in most SSA countries are relatively underdeveloped, in 
particular (long-term) bond markets (Andrianaivo & Yartey, 2010; Mezui & Hundal, 2013). 
The limited capacity of long-term domestic bond markets creates a reliance on the banking 
sector for finance (Özdemir, 2015). Unfortunately, in many SSA countries the banking sector 
is not able to support large infrastructure investments with the appropriate terms. Banking 
credit to the private sector is less than 15% of GDP in emerging markets, while it is more 
than 100% in developed countries (Andrianaivo & Yartey, 2010). A lack of (affordable) 
domestic funding for airport PPPs creates a reliance on foreign investment, which brings 
with it currency risks. In order to mitigate this, the denominating currencies of cash inflows 
and outflows of an airport PPP should be matched (Özdemir, 2015), which is not always 
feasible. 
Finally, a key aspect of the bankability of airport PPPs in SSA is the ability of the airport to 
generate sufficient income to cover costs and repay financiers. This is linked directly to the 
air traffic at the airport, as that is the key driver for aeronautical revenues directly, and non-
aeronautical revenues indirectly. As highlighted earlier, in 2013 there were only 32 airports 
in Africa with more than 1 MAP, which is often considered the minimum level of traffic for 
an airport to be profitable. This means the pool of prospective airport PPPs in SSA is limited 
from the perspective of revenue potential. Rikhy et al (2014) point out that many of the 
airports in the world that have not yet been privatised are in small markets or are regional 
airports with relatively low levels of air traffic. Moreover, they point out that “politically and 
economically unstable emerging markets” (p. 303) provide a challenging environment for 
investors to ensure recovery of their investments and compensation for risks. Long-term 
traffic growth rate forecasts of around 4 to 7% per annum for Africa can make for bankable 
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projects. However, Coombs (2011) urges caution in using the link between GDP growth and 
passenger traffic growth in forecasting, as pressure on airline profitability may put pressure 
on aeronautical revenues for airports. Important to note here is that the growth of air traffic 
in Africa is limited due to the highly regulated aviation markets that are subject to restrictive 
bilateral agreements (InterVISTAS, 2014). It is argued that liberalisation of aviation markets 
(i.e. airspace) leads to lower prices and increased levels of air traffic, which in turn supports 
the bankability of airport PPPs.  
5.7. Discussion 
The contributions of transportation infrastructure, including airports, to economic 
development have been studied extensively and positive linkages have been established. As 
many developing countries struggle to mobilise sufficient funds from their budgets for the 
development of transportation infrastructure, project finance, and PPPs in particular, offer a 
way to involve the private sector in funding of infrastructure development. It has been 
argued that this can bring several benefits including greater efficiency in operations and 
maintenance of the infrastructure.  
PPPs have been applied to the development of airport infrastructure worldwide, although 
not as widely in emerging markets. Past examples of airport PPPs in SSA are limited and 
peer-reviewed literature on the topic is scarce. This means governments in SSA who are 
considering their options for financing airport developments face a lack of insight into the 
possibilities and challenges associated with PPPs.  
This research aims to address this gap in literature by exploring the benefits, risks, 
opportunities and challenges associated with airport PPPs in SSA. It aims to identify 
pertinent issues that are faced by governments and their perceptions of the applicability of 
the various PPPs models available to further much-needed airport developments in the 
region.  
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6. Research Design and Methodology 
6.1. Introduction 
The research questions posed in this study relate to a subject, airport PPPs in SSA, on which 
limited research literature is available. Very little is known about the views on the topic of 
the stakeholder of interest to this study, governments in SSA. According to Creswell (2009) 
this type of research warrants a qualitative approach that is exploratory in nature, as 
opposed to a quantitative approach that seeks to test an objective hypothesis. Creswell 
(2009) argues that the qualitative research process is focused on the formation of an 
understanding, by the researcher, of the view that the participants in the study hold on the 
topic. It typically involves multiple forms of data, including (publicly available) documents 
and interviews with participants. Mack, Woodsong, MacQueen, Guest & Namey (2005) 
argue that qualitative research enables rich and explanatory views on the topic to be 
developed and intangible and unexpected factors to be identified. 
This study is exploratory and practice-oriented in nature, as it aims to identify motivations, 
limitations, concerns and challenges that are faced by governments in SSA in relation to 
airport PPPs. The lack of information available on this topic presents the need to obtain 
first-hand information (i.e. primary data) from these governments. The chosen research 
method for this is in-depth interviews. 
However, in order to inform the interview process, it is important to be aware of the latest 
developments on the topic of airport PPPs in emerging markets. The most important airport 
PPPs in emerging markets in the last few years have occurred in Brazil in India. As these 
developments have been reported on widely (in popular press rather than peer-reviewed 
literature) it is likely that they will have influenced the view of SSA governments on the 
topic. Therefore, document-based case studies have been conducted to explore these 
recent developments.  
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6.2. Case Studies 
6.2.1. Methodology  
According to Creswell (2009) and Dul & Hak (2008), in a case study a researcher explores 
one or a small number of cases, bounded by time and activity, in their real life context and 
findings from the case(s) are analysed in a qualitative manner. Dul & Hak (2008) argue that 
case studies are particularly suited for descriptive practice-oriented research that aims to 
contribute to the knowledge of practitioners. According to Yin (2003) and Hancock & 
Algozinne (2006) a descriptive case study describes an event (a case) and the real-life 
context in which it took place.  
One of the research sub-questions relates to drawing insights from past airport PPPs in 
emerging markets. In order to address this aspect of the research, the case studies 
conducted aim to grow the knowledge on the recent airport PPPs in the emerging markets 
of Brazil and India. The knowledge gained from these case studies informed the interviews 
with SSA governments conducted in this study and can benefit practitioners in the field of 
airport PPPs.  
In line with Dul & Hak (2008) the methodology followed for the document-based case 
studies includes the following steps, which are described in more detail in the following 
sections: 
 Case selection 
 Data collection 
 Analysis 
6.2.2. Case selection  
In order to draw insights from airport PPPs in emerging markets, the population of eligible 
cases to be studied contains all past airport PPPs in all emerging markets. From this 
population we selected cases, through purposive sampling, that are of particular interest to 
this study (Mack et al, 2005; Dul & Hak, 2008; Creswell, 2009). According to Mack et al 
(2005) purposive sampling is one of the most widely used methods of choosing study 
subjects based on pre-selected criteria that are applicable to the research question at hand.  
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As the thinking on airport PPPs continues to evolve, due to changes in the competitive 
environment (e.g. the global economy, industry regulation, etc.), it is important to look at 
recent cases, certainly no more than 10 years old. Furthermore, due to limited availability of 
data on airport PPP transactions, it is imperative to choose cases on which sufficient 
information is available. 
From the emerging market perspective, two countries immediately come to the fore: Brazil 
and India. Both countries have implemented several airport PPPs in the last decade, which 
have all been widely publicised and debated (in popular media). 
According to World Bank (2015b) classifications Brazil is an upper middle income country 
(with a GDP per capita in 2014 of US$ 11,384 and a population of 206 million) and India is a 
lower middle income country (with a GDP per capita in 2014 of US$ 1,582 and a population 
of 1.295 billion). Most of SSA is classified as lower middle to low income, with the 
exceptions of Gabon, Namibia, Botswana, Mauritius and South Africa which are upper 
middle income. The average GDP per capita of SSA is US$ 1,777 and the total population is 
973 million. 
Looking at these indicators it seems that Brazil provides a reference point for the upper 
middle income countries in SSA, and those aspiring to move into that category. India 
provides a closer reference to the lower middle income countries in SSA, and those low 
income countries that are hoping to grow to that level. As part of the so-called BRICS (Brazil, 
Russia, India, China and South Africa) group of leading emerging markets, these two 
countries certainly seem to be relevant cases for this study.  
6.2.3. Data collection 
According to Baxter & Jack (2008) case study research typically uses multiple data sources, 
which are analysed jointly, rather than separately. As phenomena can be viewed from 
different perspectives, using various data sources increases the validity of the research 
findings (Baxter & Jack, 2008; Dul & Hak, 2008; Creswell, 2009). This process of cross-
checking different data sources, data types or researchers is known as triangulation and is 
used to enhance the strength of these case studies. 
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The document-based case studies of airport PPPs in Brazil and India made use of publicly 
available information, mainly from the following sources: 
 Scientific, peer-reviewed, publications 
 Media publications (popular/commercial) 
 Company information 
According to Creswell (2009) the limitations of document-based case studies are that some 
of the information may not be publicly available, may be hard to find or may be incomplete. 
Further, he points out that authenticity and accuracy of documents may be an area of 
concern. On the other hand, he asserts the advantages being that documents are 
unobtrusive (i.e. no direct interaction with participants is required), represent data that 
have been put together thoughtfully and are more time- and cost-effective than other 
information sources (i.e. observations or interviews). 
Due to time, geography and cost limitations no interviews or other participant interactions 
have been conducted for these case studies. This is considered acceptable as the purpose of 
these case studies is to provide context, understanding and background to the further 
research that is conducted in SSA through interviews.  
6.2.4. Analysis framework 
According to Baxter & Jack (2008), at the stage where the gathered data is analysed, a 
“conceptual framework serves as an anchor for the study” (p. 553). They argue that such a 
framework can support the researcher in determining what to include in the analysis, what 
likely relationships are based on logic and theory, and in grouping or classifying certain 
elements. 
The analysis framework used in the case studies of airport PPPs in Brazil and India is based 
on the theory of airport PPPs outlined in the literature review. The following elements are of 
key importance to the understanding of the airport PPPs that took place in the countries, 
and the insights that may be drawn from them: 
 Deal structure; the various parties involved in the concession arrangements for the 
various airports. Of particular interest is the role the government plays in these 
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deals, through participation, support and regulation. Further, the type of private 
parties involved, and their origins, have been identified. 
 Regulatory environment; the particular regulatory regime applied to govern the 
various airport privatizations (i.e. the till structure). As noted in the literature review 
the till structure is of key importance to airport PPPs as it influences the revenue 
generated. 
 Investments; the investments required to obtain the concession and the prescribed 
infrastructure upgrades. These capital outlays are crucial to the bankability of the 
airport PPPs. 
 Air traffic; the level of air traffic at the various airports and the growth thereof. As 
outlined in the literature review the air traffic determines, directly and indirectly, the 
revenues generated by an airport and is therefore of paramount importance in 
airport PPP deals.  
 Possible results of PPP deals; the possible positive or negative effects observed by 
stakeholders in the PPP deals. For example, these results may be financial 
performance by the concessionaire, or service levels experienced by airport users.  
Each of the above elements have been analysed for the airport PPPs in Brazil and India in 
order to gain a deeper understanding and draw insights. Subsequently, the findings from 
each of the two countries have been compared in order to identify possible trends, or 
significant differences.  
6.3. Interviews 
6.3.1. Methodology 
Interviews enable a researcher to gain new and vivid insights into a specific topic, expressed 
in the words of the respondents (Mack et al, 2005; Folkestad, 2008). According to Mack et al 
(2005) the interviewee is considered an expert and the interviewer intends to learn as much 
as possible about the topic from the expert. Inherent to the interview methodology is that 
the information gathered is indirect and filtered through the interpretation and expression 
of the interviewees (Creswell, 2009). 
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Interviewers should pose questions in a neutral manner and not lead the interviewee 
according to preconceived ideas or (dis)approval. Creswell (2009) argues that open-ended 
questions allow interviewees to express their views freely and in their own words, thus 
reducing the influence of the interviewer’s past experience and opinions. Interviews allow 
for a measure of flexibility that enables the researcher to ask follow-up questions and 
probes based on the participant’s responses. Probes can be used to stimulate the interview, 
clarify responses, or delve deeper into a response (Harrell & Bradley, 2009).  
Mack et al (2005) describe that one major advantage of using interviews as part of 
exploratory research is that open-ended questions and probing allow respondents to 
answer in their own words, which enables responses that are (p. 4): 
 meaningful and culturally salient to the participant 
 unanticipated by the researcher 
 rich and explanatory in nature 
Furthermore, Folkestad (2008) and Nohl (2009) claim that results from multiple interviews 
can be compared, as the respondents are asked for their views on the same topics. This 
does require the interviews to be somewhat standardised. In terms of standardisation 
Harrell & Bradley (2009) and Baumgartner & Pahl-Wostl (2013) describe a spectrum of 
interview approaches, ranging from improvisation to determination, highlighting that a 
common factor amongst all is the freedom of participants in answering the interview 
questions. Two common categories of interviews on this spectrum are structured and semi-
structured interviews (Harrell & Bradley, 2009; Woods, 2011). 
Structured interviews are characterised by the pre-planning of all the questions asked, 
which allows for exact replication of the interview with numerous respondents. 
Questionnaires and surveys are structured interview techniques that are often used in 
research. The main advantages of structured interviews are the possibilities for replication 
with many respondents, the high level of comparison or generalisation that is possible and 
the reliability of results due to internal consistency. However, the main disadvantage is the 
restrictive nature of questioning yielding restricted answers (Woods, 2011). 
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Due to the exploratory nature of this study and the limited number of respondents, semi-
structured interviews were deemed a more suitable method. In semi-structured interviews 
the questions asked are partially pre-planned, allowing for a degree of flexibility in probing 
and follow-up. This allows for much richer and more detailed information to be obtained 
and a deeper understanding to be developed than is possible with other research methods 
(Harrell & Bradley, 2009; Nohl, 2009). However, results from semi-structured interviews are 
more difficult to compare and generalise than those of structured interviews (Woods, 2011).  
6.3.2. Respondent selection 
In order to learn about the views on airport PPPs of the governments in SSA, the total 
population of possible participants in the interviews for this study consists of the relevant 
persons in the governments of all countries in SSA. Using the commonly applied method of 
purposive sampling those participants that are of interest to this study were selected (Mack 
et al, 2005; Creswell, 2009). As the objective of these interviews is to explore and gain an 
understanding of the views of SSA governments on airport PPPs, a random sampling 
strategy would be inappropriate (Baumgartner & Pahl-Wostl, 2013). The purpose is not to 
generate a representative sample and generalise results, but rather to gain a rich and deep 
understanding of the topic by interviewing people who are well-informed. The criteria that 
were used to select the possible participants in the interviews are the following: 
 Air traffic; as discussed in the literature review, the level of air traffic at an airport is 
an important factor in airport PPPs. The generally accepted minimum level of air 
traffic for an airport to be profitable is 1 million annual passengers (MAP). This 
means that only those airports with more than 1 MAP, or those that are expected to 
reach 1 MAP in the foreseeable future, are interesting candidates for PPPs. 
Therefore, only governments of countries with such airports are selected for this 
study.  
 Geographical spread; in order to gain a broad view of the topic throughout SSA, the 
selected respondents should represent a reasonable geographical spread. For this 
reason respondents were selected from countries in Southern, East and West Africa.  
 Access by researcher; for the researcher to establish contact and set up interviews 
with the relevant respondents within the limited time frame of this study, access to 
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the appropriate persons in the countries of interest was needed. The selection of 
respondents was thus limited to those countries where the researcher has access to 
the relevant networks. 
 Knowledge and authority; within the selected SSA governments the appropriate 
respondents would be those people with sufficient knowledge on the topic (i.e. 
subject matter experts) and an authority to share the views of the governments they 
represent. Therefore, it was imperative to ensure the right respondent in each 
government was approached. 
 Willingness and availability; as the topic of the interviews relates to government 
policies and considerations regarding the privatisation of airports, this could be 
considered sensitive or confidential information. It is crucial that respondents are 
willing to share their views on this topic and allow for it to be published in this study. 
Moreover, availability to participate in the interviews within the limited timeframe 
of this study was essential. 
Whether a country has had experience with airport PPPs in the past was not considered a 
criterion for respondent selection. The views of governments both with and without 
experience are valuable when looking ahead to future airport developments.  
Based on the abovementioned selection criteria, respondents from the following countries 
were approached with a request for participation in this study (i.e. to determine their 
willingness and availability): 
1. Botswana 
2. Ethiopia 
3. Ghana 
4. Kenya 
5. Mozambique 
6. Namibia 
7. Nigeria 
8. Rwanda 
9. South Africa 
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10. Tanzania 
11. Zambia 
6.3.3. Data collection 
Interviews can be conducted face-to-face, via the telephone, via e-mail, or using other 
digital communication methods such as (video) chat programs (Opdenakker, 2006; Creswell, 
2009). Opdenakker (2006) states that the advantages and disadvantages of the various 
interview methods can be characterised according to the dimensions of time and space, or 
according to technology used. He relates the main differences between the methods to 
synchronous or asynchronous “communication in time and/or space” (p. 2), as outlined in 
Table 6-1.  
Table 6-1: Four interview methods divided according to synchronous or asynchronous communication in time and/or 
space (adapted from: Opdenakker, 2006) 
 Time Place 
Synchronous communication Face-to-face 
Telephone 
Video / chat 
Face-to-face 
Asynchronous communication E-mail E-mail 
Telephone 
Video / chat 
 
According to Opdenakker (2006) face-to-face interviewing is the only method that is 
synchronous in both time and space and therefore provides the full advantages of social 
cues, spontaneity and direct interaction without time delay. However, he points out that 
these advantages bring with them additional complexity on the part of the interviewer, who 
has to manage the use of social cues and direct interaction so as to not bias or influence the 
results of the interview. The face-to-face interviews were recorded, with the permission of 
the respondents, to enable accurate analysis and reporting. In addition, notes were taken by 
the researcher during the interviews. 
Face-to-face interviews were considered the preferred method for this study as they would 
provide the richest and most detailed results on the complex topic of the study. However, 
due to the geographical spread of the respondents, time and costs meant it was not feasible 
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to carry out all interviews in person. Some of the interviews, therefore, were conducted via 
telephone.  
Opdenakker (2006) notes that telephone interviews are synchronous in time, but 
asynchronous in space, thereby extending access to participants. He points out that the 
visual social cues are not available, but the language- and voice-based social cues can still be 
used. According to Creswell (2009) the limited contact between interviewee and interviewer 
in telephone interviews can be outweighed by the greater flexibility in scheduling and 
access to participants. The telephone interviews were recorded using the speaker-phone 
functionality, and notes were taken by the researcher. 
It should be noted that video chat programs (e.g. Skype) were considered for the interviews 
that could not be carried out face-to-face, because they provide the visual social cues that 
telephone interviews do not. However, the high quality internet connections required for 
this were not available in all places and therefore it was decided not to use this method, but 
opt for telephone interviews instead. 
All the selected respondents were approached with a personalised e-mail request for an 
interview, with a short description of the study topic and objectives. Suitable dates and 
times were then arranged for both the face-to-face and telephone interviews. All of the 
interviews started with an introduction of the study, description of the research objective 
and questions, discussion on practical matters, such as terms of confidentiality, copyright, 
recording and the expected length of the interview, and an opportunity for interviewees to 
ask questions before the start. A list of guiding questions, or interview guideline, provided in 
Appendix A, was used by the researcher to provide a frame for the discussion and to ensure 
the relevant questions were asked and topics were addressed (Harrell & Bradley, 2009).  
As described by Creswell (2009) the interview script contains a number of fact-based, or ice-
breaker, questions to start off with. Following, there are several open-ended questions, with 
various sub-questions that can be used for probing. Questions focus on the present first, 
before moving on to the future.  
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6.3.4. Analysis framework 
The analysis and interpretation of narrative data, obtained through interviews, is often 
referred to as content analysis (Taylor-Powell & Renner, 2003). The process of data analysis 
is considered to be continuous and iterative, and lines between data collection, analysis and 
interpretation can be blurred (Folkestad, 2008; Creswell, 2009).  
The content analysis process followed for this study is based on the descriptions by Taylor-
Powell & Renner (2003), Piercy (2004) and Creswell (2009) and is shown in Figure 6-1. Each 
of the steps is briefly described below. 
 
 
Figure 6-1: Content analysis process (adapted from: Taylor-Powell & Renner, 2003; Piercy, 2004; Creswell, 2009) 
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1. Preparing and familiarising; in the first step of the analysis the interview are 
transcribed and notes taken are typed up. The transcripts were then read through 
and notes made in the margin to record early observations. 
 
2. Coding and describing; the second step of the content analysis involved the 
development of preliminary descriptive and interpretive categories, or codes. These 
codes are developed based on the actual contents of the interviews, on the 
knowledge gained from the document-based case studies and from the literature 
review. Both substantive (i.e. about the content) and attribute(i.e. about the 
respondent’s characteristics) coding trees were developed, in a deductive and 
iterative manner, based around the research questions and knowledge of the 
respondents.  
 
3. Conceptualisation; in this step of the analysis the preliminary categories are 
analysed further, with the aim of identifying connections between the various codes. 
The coding tree was expanded further with sub-codes where relevant. 
 
4. Interrelating; in the fourth step of the analysis themes within and between the 
codes are identified. A theme is considered a meaning that is common across various 
instances within the interview data. Themes were described in a narrative to convey 
the findings of the study. 
 
5. Interpretation; this final step of the analysis brings it all together and aims to elicit 
answers to the research questions from the data. The themes identified in the 
various interviews are compared across various groupings (e.g. between countries or 
regions, according to level of air traffic in the country, experience with airport PPPs, 
etc.) and related to the document-based case studies and literature review.  
 
Throughout the content analysis process the validity of the findings has been checked using 
triangulation. The accuracy of statements by interviewees, as well as themes emerging from 
the interviews, was examined by cross-checking against the findings from the literature, and 
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other documentation that may be available on the specific topic. Any discrepant 
information that does not converge with the findings from the interviews has been 
presented in order to enhance the realism of the findings and highlight the complex and 
disparate views that exist (Creswell, 2009).  
The conceptual framework used in the content analysis corresponded to the research 
questions posed in this study. It was founded on the key aspects of airport PPPs analysed in 
the document-based case studies, and on the topical theory outlined in the literature 
review.   
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7. Case Study Brazil 
7.1. Background 
Brazil, a vast country in Latin America, stretches more than 4000km from north to south and 
from east to west, and covers almost half of Latin America’s total land area. According to 
the World Bank (2015b), in 2014 Brazil had a population of 206 million and a total GDP of 
US$ 2.346 trillion at market prices. With a GDP per capita of US$ 11,384 it is classified as an 
upper middle income country. 
The country is a federation consisting of 26 states and one federal district, which contains 
the capital Brasília. It is generally divided into 5 geographical regions: Northern, Northeast, 
Central-West, Southeast and Southern. 
The Brazilian Airport Infrastructure Enterprise (Empresa Brasileira de Infraestrutura 
Aeroportuária or Infraero) was established in 1972 as a government corporation (ICAO, 
2013c). It was responsible for managing the country’s main commercial airports and those 
in the federal district. In 2011 it managed 66 airports, which represented 97% of Brazil’s air 
traffic (Switzerland Global Enterprise, 2013). According to ICAO (2013c) the various State 
Governments manage the 121 secondary airports in their territory and various cities 
manage another 131 secondary airports and airfields. The Brazilian Air Force and Navy 
manage their own military airports. Pinto (2012) states that there are 129 airports in 127 
cities that receive regular flights and the main network is made up of the 26 State capitals, 
the national capital, two additional airports in São Paulo and one in Belo Horizonte.  
The Switzerland Global Enterprise (2013) describes how a rising middle class, strong growth 
in tourism and the hosting of the 2014 FIFA World Cup and 2016 Summer Olympics caused 
(and may cause) substantial growth in air traffic. Furthermore, neglected transport 
infrastructure in the country and, in particular, underinvestment by Infraero, have led to 
most important airports in Brazil reaching critical occupation levels, prompting the urgent 
need for airport capacity upgrades and modernisations. According to Pinto (2012), a study 
conducted in 2010 indicated that nineteen of the twenty largest airports in the country 
were severely constrained in terms of terminal building and aircraft parking capacity. The 
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Switzerland Global Enterprise (2013) quotes a figure of R$ 7.3 billion (approximately US$ 1.8 
billion) estimated by the Federal Government to be required to upgrade 13 airports for the 
2014 FIFA World Cup. Given the amount of capital estimated to be required for the 
necessary upgrades, the government decided to introduce private investor participation in 
the airport developments. 
7.2. Concessions 
The first of the airports to be developed using a PPP model by the Federal Government was 
the Governador Aluízio Alves International Airport in São Gonçalo do Amarante near Natal, 
the capital of Rio Grande do Norte state. The greenfield airport, known as Aeroporto de 
Natal (IATA code: NAT), was opened in May 2014 and is operated by the Inframérica 
consortium on a 25-year concession (with the possibility of a 5-year extension). This 
concession was purchased in 2011 through an international competitive bidding process for 
US$ 106 million, giving the consortium a 100% equity ownership of the airport (Leigh Fisher, 
2012; Airline Leader, 2014). This concession has been both referred to as a “benchmark for 
what might eventually become the norm” (Airline Leader, 2014) and a “trial privatization” 
(Centre for Aviation, 2013).  
The second round of airport PPPs in Brazil was completed in early 2012 and involved three 
major airports, two in São Paulo and one in Brasília. According to the Centre for Aviation 
(2013) the concessions were concluded quickly as the 2014 FIFA World Cup was imminent 
and the government faced criticism “as to its tardiness in resolving infrastructure issues”.  
The concession for the Presidente Juscelino Kubitschek International Airport in Brasília (IATA 
code: BSB) was awarded to the Inframérica consortium that had also won the earlier NAT 
concession. The 25-year concession was sold for approximately US$ 2.6 billion. A 20-year 
concession for the country’s busiest airport, São Paulo–Guarulhos (IATA code: GRU), was 
won by the Invepar-ACSA consortium for approximately US$ 9 billion. For Campinas-
Viracopos (IATA code: VCP), in São Paulo, the 30-year concession was awarded to the Brazil 
Airports Consortium for around US$ 2.2 billion. 
According to the Centre for Aviation (2013) the second round of airport PPPs was followed 
by a “lengthy period of introspection in the government”, considering the lessons learnt and 
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changes to be made for the next round. The main points of contention were the minimum 
level of experience that the airport operator parties in the consortia should have, the 
limitations on previous winners to bid for new concessions and the role of Infraero in the 
privatised airports. 
Round three of the airport PPPs in Brazil was concluded in 2014, involving the main airports 
of Rio de Janeiro and Belo Horizonte. The 25-year concession for Rio de Janeiro–Galeão 
International Airport (IATA code: GIG) was awarded to the RIOgaleão consortium for an 
amount of US$ 7.9 billion. For the Tancredo Neves International Airport (IATA code: CNF) in 
Confins near Belo Horizonte, the concession was won by a consortium known as BH Airport 
for approximately US$ 812 million.  
In early 2015 the Brazilian Government announced the fourth round of airport PPPs will take 
place in the second quarter of 2016 (Ramalho, 2015). This round will involve the following 
four airports: 
 Salgado Filho International Airport in Porto Alegre (IATA code: POA) 
 Deputado Luís Eduardo Magalhães International Airport in Salvador de Bahia (IATA 
code: SSA) 
 Pinto Martins International Airport in Fortaleza (IATA code: FOR) 
 Hercílio Luz International Airport in Florianópolis (IATA code: FLN) 
7.3. Role of government 
In airport PPPs governments play various different roles. Firstly, the government, through 
Infraero, was the operator of the airports that were privatised. This means Infraero 
transferred the airport operation tasks to the private concessionaires, usually over a 
transition period of 6 to 12 months (Switzerland Global Enterprise, 2013). However, Infraero 
retained an equity ownership stake in the concessions of 49% (except for the first NAT 
concession, where 100% equity is owned by the private consortium), thus maintaining a 
veto right on strategic decisions (ICAO, 2013c). Furthermore, this ownership stake of 
Infraero ensures it does not lose all the income from the privatised airports, but is still 
entitled to dividends (Pinto, 2012).  
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Secondly, the government provides the regulatory framework for the airport PPPs, mainly 
through the National Civil Aviation Agency (Agência Nacional de Aviação Civil, ANAC). ANAC 
was established in 2006 to take over from the former civil aviation authority, the Air Force’s 
Department of Civil Aviation (DAC). ANAC falls under the Presidency, and is linked to the 
Civil Aviation Secretariat (SAC) and the Ministry of Defence. In conjunction with the Federal 
Audit Court, ANAC sets the terms of the various airport PPP concessions and manages the 
bidding processes (Centre for Aviation, 2013).  
Moreover, ANAC is responsible for the economic regulation of the airport concessions. This 
means it establishes and controls the aeronautical charges the airports are allowed to 
charge their customers, which may be different for each airport. These charges include 
boarding fees, landing fees, parking fees, storage fees and cargo handling fees (ICAO, 
2013c). ANAC is an independent regulatory agency (IRA) that uses price cap regulation to 
ensure airport concessionaires do not charge monopolistic charges and fees regarding 
airport infrastructure services and operations (Serebrisky, 2012). Specifically, the Brazilian 
airport concessions operate on a hybrid-till model, whereby a part of the non-aeronautical 
revenues are directed to cover the aeronautical expenses (ICAO, 2013c). However, 
Serebrisky (2012) reports that ANAC indicated it uses a single-till model, whereby all non-
aeronautical revenues are directed towards aeronautical expenses. He does indicate that 
there seems to be conflicting information on this topic in his research. According to Pinto 
(2012), ANAC uses the price-setting rule called RPI – X – Q, where RPI is the retail price 
index, X represents productivity gains made by the concessionaire and Q is a quality of 
service index (Alexander & Irwin, 1997). Under this price-setting rule the tariffs for 
aeronautical charges are adjusted annually to allow them to rise with inflation (or the retail 
price index), but ensure the productivity gains made are shared between the concessionaire 
and the tariff-paying public, and the concessionaire is penalised if quality standards are not 
maintained. The quality of service index Q is determined through a technical report that 
uses objective measures of service quality (such as queuing times and equipment 
availability) and a user satisfaction survey (Pinto, 2012). Pinto (2012) states that the 
concession parameters (X and Q) are revised every 5 years and that the economic regulation 
allows for extraordinary revision aimed at recovery of the financial balance of the contract, 
at the request of ANAC or the concessionaire. 
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Thirdly, the SAC established the Fund for National Civil Aviation (Fundo Nacional de Aviação 
Civil, FNAC) to foster the development of civil aviation in Brazil, through the maintenance 
and modernisation of public airport infrastructure (Civil Aviation Secretariat, 2015). Each of 
the airport concessionaires is obliged to contribute a certain percentage (2 to 10%) of gross 
revenue to the FNAC on an annual basis (Pinto, 2012; Leigh Fisher, 2013). 
Beyond these three main roles, the government plays additional roles in (financing) the 
various consortia, as is described in the following sections. 
7.4. Concession parties 
The concession for each of the airports were awarded through an international competitive 
bidding process, with the winning bid defined as the one that maximised the total fixed fee 
for each airport (Pinto, 2012; Leigh Fisher, 2013).The bidding process consisted of three 
stages: 
 Each interested party was required to submit its bid for one or more of the airports 
being auctioned at the time, in writing in a sealed envelope. The highest bidders for 
each airport were then selected to participate in the following round. 
 A live, verbal bidding round took place at São Paulo’s Stock Exchange allowing the 
selected bidders to bid against each other. This round was concluded and a winner 
selected at the point where there were no new higher bids for each airport. 
 The highest bidder for each airport was invited for contract negotiations to iron out 
the details of the concession agreements. 
For the first two rounds of privatisations there was a minimum requirement for the 
concessionaires to have at least 5 years’ experience in operating airports and to have 
operated an airport with at least 5 MAP within the last 10 years (Pinto, 2012). However, 
after these two rounds President Rousseff and several bankers expressed their concerns 
over the lack of operational experience of the winning concessionaires (Rumsey, 2012; 
Centre for Aviation, 2013). For the next round, this lead to the requirement for Galeão (GIG) 
airport being raised to having an operator partner with experience operating an airport with 
at least 22 MAP, while for Confins (CNF) the requirement was 12 MAP (Leigh Fisher, 2013). 
Furthermore, the minimum equity share of the operator(s) in the consortia was raised from 
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10% to 25%. All these requirements were meant to ensure sufficient international 
experience was brought on board to ensure successful operation of the privatised airports. 
Further to operational experience, the concessionaires were expected to bring sufficient 
capital to pay for the concession fees and the required airport infrastructure upgrades, as 
well as the construction capabilities to implement these upgrades. As described by Feldman 
(2008) consortia had to be formed in order to bring together the necessary expertise, 
experience and capital. 
A multitude of international firms from all over the world were involved in the first three 
rounds of airport privatisations. As many as 11 consortia were qualified and submitted bids 
for one, two or all three of the airports in round 2. The following sections describe how each 
of the winning consortia for the first three rounds is constituted.  
7.4.1. Natal (NAT) and Brasília (BSB) 
The Inframérica consortium that won the first airport privatisation of Natal (NAT) and the 
second round concession for Brasília (BSB) was made up of Brazilian construction firm 
Engevix and Argentine conglomerate Corporación América. Engevix is a large engineering, 
procurement and construction (EPC) contractor active in the power, infrastructure and 
heavy industry sectors in Brazil and Latin America, Africa and Asia. In 2011 it employed more 
than 3500 people and had a turnover of over R$ 1.5 billion, which is equivalent to 
approximately US$ 375 million in today’s terms (Engevix, 2011). 
Corporación América has a wide range of activities, including construction and operation of 
road and airport infrastructure, hydrocarbon exploration and production, agriculture and 
banking. It operates passenger and cargo terminals at 53 airports in Latin America and 
Europe (Corporación América, 2016). The privately held firm was reported to have revenues 
of US$ 1.2 billion in 2014 and finances its activities through retained earnings, bond issues 
and financial support from the Brazilian Development Bank (Banco Nacional de 
Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social, BNDES) (GR Reporter, 2014).  
In May 2015 Engevix agreed to sell its stake in the Inframérica consortium to Corporación 
América as it struggled with low liquidity, due to its involvement in a large corruption 
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scandal (Agencia EFE, 2015). This on-sale deal, which made Corporación América the sole 
owner of the consortium, was reported to be worth US$ 131 million (Centre for Aviation, 
2015a). 
7.4.2. Guarulhos (GRU) 
The 20-year concession for Guarulhos airport (GRU) in São Paulo was awarded to the 
Invepar-ACSA consortium. The consortium is led by Brazilian infrastructure concession firm 
Invepar (Investimentos e Participações em Infraestrutura S.A.), which holds 90% of the 
equity. Invepar operates concessions for airports, highways and rapid transit systems in 
Brazil and Peru. The company is owned in equal portions by engineering and construction 
firm OAS and Brazil’s three largest pension funds: PREVI, the pension fund of state-owned 
bank Banco do Brasil, FUNCEF, the pension fund of state-owned Bank CAIXA, and Petros, the 
pension fund of state-owned petrochemicals firm Petrobras (The Economist, 2012; Leigh 
Fisher, 2013; BM&F Bovespa, 2015).  
Airports Company South Africa Limited (ACSA) is the airport operating partner in the 
consortium. ACSA is a state-owned company that operates nine of South Africa’s largest 
international airports and holds a stake in Mumbai Chhatrapati Shivaji Airport, India.  
7.4.3. Viracopos (VCP) 
The Brazil Airports Consortium that was awarded the 30-year concession for Viracopos 
(VCP) consists of Brazilian infrastructure firm Triunfo Participações e Investimentos (45%), 
Brazilian conglomerate UTC Participações (45%) and French airport operator and investor 
Egis Airport Operation (10%). 
Triunfo is a listed firm with revenues of approximately US$ 1 billion and employment of 
approximately 4500 professionals in 2014 (Triunfo, 2016). It is involved with toll road 
concessions, port administration, airports and energy infrastructure.  
UTC is a holding firm that controls various companies in heavy industry, civil construction, 
real estate, defence, hydrocarbons and investment. In 2013 the company had revenues of 
approximately R$ 4.4 billion, equivalent to US$ 1.1 billion in today’s terms (UTC, 2013). 
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Egis is an engineering and infrastructure firm that is active in the transport, building, energy, 
water and building sectors. Egis operates 14 airports around Europe, Latin America, Africa 
and Oceania (Egis, 2016). According to its website the firm had revenues of EUR 854 million 
in 2014, equivalent to US$ 927 in today’s terms. The firm is 75% owned by the French state-
owned financial institution Caisse des Dépôts and the remaining 25% is owned by the 
partners and employees. According to the Centre for Aviation (2013) Egis is well known for 
its activities in emerging markets and has a reputation for its ability to enhance existing 
airport infrastructure and service levels.  
7.4.4. Galeão (GIG) 
The third round concession for Galeão (GIG) was won by the RIOgaleão consortium, which is 
composed of the giant Brazilian conglomerate Odebrecht (60%) and Singaporean airport 
operator and investor Changi Airports International (40%). The consortium also bid on all 
three of the airports in round 2 but was not successful at that time (Pinto, 2012).  
Odebrecht is active in the fields of engineering and construction, industry, infrastructure 
and energy in 21 countries. According to its website the firm had revenues of R$ 108 billion 
in 2014, which is close to US$ 27 billion in today’s terms. The firm’s construction subsidiary 
Construtora Norberto Odebrecht S.A. is Latin America’s largest construction firm and 
focuses on large-scale infrastructure projects, including airports (BNamericas, 2016).  
Changi Airports International (CAI) is a subsidiary of the state-owned Changi Airport Group, 
which has operated Changi International Airport in Singapore since 1981. CAI is active as an 
investor and consultant at 11 airports in China, India, the Middle East and Europe 
(RIOgaleão, 2016).  
7.4.5. Confins (CNF) 
The consortium BH Airport (previously known as AeroBrasil) won the concession for Confins 
(CNF) airport. This consortium is led by Brazilian concession company CCR (75%), who joined 
forces with Swiss airport operator Flughafen Zürich (24%) and German airport operator 
Flughafen Munich (1%). CCR and Flughafen Zürich also bid for two of the airport concessions 
in round 2 but were not successful in those bids (Pinto, 2012).  
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With revenues of approximately US$ 2.5 billion, CCR is one of the largest infrastructure 
concession companies in Brazil (CCR, 2016). It operates highways and metro lines and hold 
stakes in various infrastructure-related companies. The firm was listed on the São Paulo 
Stock Exchange in 2009 and its two largest shareholders are the Brazilian conglomerates 
Andrade Gutierrez (holding 17%) and Camargo Corrêa (holding 15%) (BM&F Bovespa, 2016). 
Taking part in the consortium was the first time Flughafen Munich owned a stake in an 
airport outside Germany (Flughafen Munich, 2014). The company later sold its stake in the 
consortium to Flughafen Zürich, which increased its holding to 25% (Centre for Aviation, 
2015a). 
Besides being the operator of Zürich International Airport in Switzerland since 2000, 
Flughafen Zürich is active at 10 airports in 7 countries in Latin America and Asia (Flughafen 
Zürich, 2016).  
7.4.6. Overview of concession parties 
The six airport PPP deals concluded so far have involved airport operators from Argentina 
(Corporación América), South Africa (ACSA), France (Egis), Singapore (Changi) and 
Switzerland (Flughafen Zürich). Each of these parties is expected to bring experience of 
managing large international airports to the Brazilian airports.  
Further to the operators, each of the winning consortia contains a large Brazilian 
conglomerate or infrastructure concession firm. These firms typically have access to 
substantial amounts of capital and have experience in operating infrastructure concessions 
in Brazil. 
Finally, the consortia all contain (either directly or through the conglomerates) large 
construction firms. These firms provide the expertise in large-scale infrastructure 
construction projects that is required for the necessary airport upgrades. 
Further, it should be noted that governments play a significant role in (the financing of) 
these consortia. The infrastructure concession company Invepar that was part of the 
consortium that won the GRU concession is majority owned by Brazilian state pension 
funds. The airport operator party in this consortium is ACSA, which is owned by the South 
Research Report 
 
 
Marcel Langeslag  52 
African state. Other international airport operators, Egis and Changi, are also state-owned in 
France and Singapore respectively.  
Moreover, the BNDES is responsible for most of the financing of the round 2 deals, providing 
subsidised (6% interest rate) local currency loans with a 15-year tenor for the BSB and GRU 
concessions and a 20-year tenor for the VCP deal (Rumsey, 2012). It reportedly finances 60% 
of construction works and 80% of the acquisition of national equipment (Winterstein, 2012; 
Switzerland Global Enterprise, 2013). These arrangements have led to comments by some 
commercial banks about a missed opportunity for bond financing (Rumsey, 2012).  
7.5. Concession financials 
The concessions were awarded to the highest bidder in terms of the fixed concession fee. 
ANAC had set minimum values for the fixed fees, which were all exceeded by the bidders. 
The fixed concession fee is due in annual payments that are adjusted for inflation (Pinto, 
2012). In the case of GRU the winning bid was more than 4 times higher than the minimum 
and according to The Economist (2012) this raised concerns amongst commentators who 
argued that the government (through BNDES and the state pension funds that own Invepar) 
was dealing with the government (ANAC). The fixed concession fees give the winning 
bidders a 51% stake in the airport concessions, with the remaining 49% being owned by 
Infraero (except for NAT where the private concessionaire owns 100%).  
In addition to the fixed fee, the concessionaires are required to contribute annually to the 
FNAC fund a percentage of gross revenue. These percentages range from 2% to 10% and in 
the round 2 deals subject to a higher percentage for revenues above an upper bracket 
(Pinto, 2012; Leigh Fisher, 2013).  
As part of the concession deals, each concessionaire is required to make certain investments 
in expansion and upgrade of the airport infrastructure. Investments in airside infrastructure 
(e.g. runways, taxiways and aprons) are linked to air traffic movements (i.e. landings and 
take-offs) and terminal building upgrades are linked to peak passenger numbers, in order 
maintain a certain level of services, specified by IATA as Level C (Pinto, 2012).  
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An overview of the fixed concession fees, the minimum auction prices, variable FNAC 
contributions and required investments for each of the airport PPP deals are provided in 
Table 7-1. 
Table 7-1: Financial details of Brazilian airport PPPs (from: Pinto, 2012 and BMI Research, 2014) 
Round Airport 
Concession 
Duration 
Concession 
Fee 
Minimum 
fee 
Investments 
required 
FNAC 
contribution 
  (years) (R$ million) (R$ million) (R$ million) (% of revenue) 
1 NAT 25 170 52 650 N/A 
2 
GRU 20 16 210 3 400 4 600 10% (15%) 
BSB 25 4 510 582 2 800 2% (4.5%) 
VCP 30 3 800 1 500 8 700 5% (7.5%) 
3 
GIG 25 19 000 4 830 5 700 5% 
CNF 30 1 800 1 090 3 500 5% 
 
7.6. GDP and air traffic 
From the literature review we know that air traffic is a major factor in the bankability of 
airport PPPs as it is a driver for both aeronautical and non-aeronautical revenues. According 
to Bhadra (2008) GDP and per capita income are the two main drivers of air traffic demand 
in both developed and developing countries. 
A minimum of 1 MAP is often cited as the boundary for profitability for airports (Foster & 
Briceño-Garmendia, 2010; ICAO, 2013b). Private investors in airport infrastructure will 
consider the level of air traffic at an airport, as well as the historic and forecast growth 
thereof.  
As shown in Figure 7-1 passenger air traffic in Brazil has grown substantially over the last 
decade, reaching a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of more than 8%. Ramalho (2015) 
presents a forecast of 6% CAGR for the next 20 years. According to Leigh Fisher (2013) GDP 
growth has been a major driver for air traffic growth, along with economic deregulation of 
the airline industry and the entrance of low cost carriers (LCCs), leading to a reduction in air 
fares. Figure 7-2 shows how growth in GDP and air traffic have largely moved together, 
reaching a peak in 2010. Since then GDP growth has slumped to 0.14% in 2014 (Centre for 
Aviation, 2015a).  
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As NAT was a greenfield airport opened in 2014 there was no historic traffic data available 
for investors to consider. However, at the time of the concession award in 2011, the 
Augusto Severo International Airport from which the new NAT was to take over handled 
approximately 2.7 million passengers. ACI (2015) traffic figures from 2014 show that since 
its opening in May 2014 the new NAT airport handled just over 1 million passengers in the 
remainder of the year. 
All the round 2 airports handle well over 1 MAP and showed strong growth in the years 
before and after privatisation in 2012 (see Figure 7-3). In the years from 2005 up to 
privatisation GRU achieved a CAGR of 8.8%, BSB achieved 6.5% and VCP a staggering 33.0%.  
Figure 7-4 shows that the round 3 airports also showed high levels of passenger air traffic 
and strong growth. In the years leading up to privatisation GIG achieved a CAGR of 7.3% and 
CNF achieved 14.5%. Even though GDP growth had slowed down considerably from the 
height of 2010, these airport PPP deals still attracted investments substantially above their 
set minimum values. This shows that investors remain confident that in the long-term traffic 
levels and growth will be sufficient to achieve the required return on investments. The 
Centre for Aviation (2015a) raised some question marks relating to a possible effect of the 
recent low GDP growth (or even contraction) on the upcoming round 4 concessions. 
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Figure 7-1: Total passenger air traffic in Brazil (from: Ramalho, 2015) 
 
 
Figure 7-2: Change in GDP and air traffic in Brazil (from: World Bank, 2015b and ACI, 2015) 
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Figure 7-3: Passenger air traffic at GRU, BSB and VCP airports (from: ACI, 2015) 
 
Figure 7-4: Passenger air traffic at GIG and CNF airports (from: ACI, 2015) 
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7.7. Outcomes and findings 
The fact that the airport concessions auctioned so far have all been sold for prices far above 
the minimum has raised concerns amongst commentators that in order to recover their 
investments the private concessionaires will pass on costs to airlines and passengers by 
raising aeronautical fees (de Sainte Croix, 2012; The Economist, 2012). The aeronautical 
charges are of course subject to price cap regulation, which should prevent concessionaires 
from charging unreasonable amounts. It was reported that in 2014 the aeronautical charges 
at the privatised airports were increased (Alves, 2015). However, the relative lack of 
publicity or protests around this increase would suggest it was not considered excessive. A 
special report by IATA (2015, p. 3) suggested that the privatization process was clear, and 
agreed rules are in place to regulate them, but that “some essential areas are not yet 
covered by contractual limitations”. 
This is in contrast to the increase in taxes at the airports that are still managed by Infraero. 
The “airport taxes” at these airports were raised by 14.21%, which is well above inflation 
(Alves, 2015). As reported by Alves (2015), Brazil’s Consumer Defence Institute (IDEC) 
considered the increase to be “unjustifiable” and “abusive” to passengers. Since the 
privatisation of some of Brazil’s major airports, Infraero has seen its income reduce 
drastically and it ran a US$ 187 million deficit in 2014 (Centre for Aviation, 2013; Alves, 
2015; Centre for Aviation, 2015a). This is believed to be the main reason behind the 
significant increase in charges at the airports Infraero still controls. The role and structure of 
Infraero are being reviewed by the Brazilian government and it has already spun-off its 
services business into a separate company (Centre for Aviation, 2015a; Soto, 2015).  
In 2013 it was reported (Centre for Aviation, 2013) that upgrade works at airports managed 
by Infraero (GIG and CNF, at that time) were proceeding considerably slower than those at 
the privatised airports (GRU, BSB and VCP). From the sole perspective of airport upgrade 
works, the privatisations were considered a success (Centre for Aviation, 2013). 
More generally, the Brazilian government considers the privatizations so far to have been 
“very successful” (Pearson, 2013) and “positive” (Centre for Aviation, 2015a). 
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7.8. Discussion  
The recent airport PPP deals in Brazil show that the government plays a significant role in 
the privatisation process, both on the regulatory side and in the financing of the private 
parties participating in the PPPs.  
The concessions have provided the government with large revenues in the form of the fixed 
concession fees. Moreover, they provide a steady source of income to support the publicly 
controlled airports in the country, through the FNAC. Nevertheless, the process has caused 
major disruptions to the funding and role of state operator Infraero, which will have to be 
reorganised to suit the change in landscape. 
It is clear that large traffic volumes and strong traffic (and GDP) growth have played a role in 
driving up the prices paid by investors in the airport concessions. This signals investors’ 
confidence in the long term stability and growth in the Brazilian aviation sector. However, 
the role of government in financing the private consortia should not be neglected. 
Concerns have been raised about the aeronautical charges at the privatised airports. So far, 
these concerns do not seem to be warranted with effective economic regulation in place, 
although it is still early days in the duration of the concessions. 
7.9. Lessons learnt for financing airport developments in SSA 
The experiences with airport PPPs in Brazil show the importance of domestic sources of 
finance and the role of development finance. Governments in SSA would be wise to take 
these aspects into account when considering airport PPPs. Foreign sources of finance could 
introduce currency exchange rate risks that need to be factored into investment decisions. 
In case domestic finance would not be available, governments in SSA could consider 
measures to mitigate the currency exchange rate risk for investors. Development finance, or 
Official Development Assistance (ODA), could play a role in improving the bankability of 
airport PPP projects. 
Another key takeaway from the Brazilian case study is the importance of the impact of 
privatising profitable airports on the funding of unprofitable ones. The Brazilian Government 
implemented an airport infrastructure fund (FNAC) that ensures the privatised airports 
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contribute to the development of unprofitable airport infrastructure in the country. The 
fixed concession fees paid by the concessionaires and the dividends received by 
government-owned airport operator Infraero should also contribute to this cause. However, 
the changes in the industry caused by the privatisations means the role of government in 
developing, owning and operating airport infrastructure has to be redefined.  
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8. Case Study India 
8.1. Background 
India is a very large country in South Asia that spans almost 3000km from north to south 
and from east to west. With a population of approximately 1.295 billion in 2014, it is the 
world’s second most populous (World Bank, 2015b). According to the World Bank (2015b) 
India is a lower middle income country with a GDP per capita of US$ 1,582 in 2014. 
The country is made up of 29 states and 7 union territories, which are governed by the 
Central (or Union) Government, and the capital New Delhi is located in the state of Delhi. 
The Airports Authority of India (AAI) was formed in 1995 by a merger of the National Airport 
Authority and the International Airports Authority of India (Bhadra, 2008). Its mandate is to 
build, manage and develop civil aviation infrastructure in the country and to provide air 
navigation services. The AAI manages 125 airports (including 18 international, 78 domestic 
and 26 civil enclaves at Defence airfields) and has a strong track record of upgrading airport 
infrastructure (Centre for Aviation, 2014b). According to Jain, Raghuram & Gangwar (2007) 
only 60 of the AAI airports received regular scheduled flights and only 11 operated 
profitably. It has been argued that the AAI’s “lack of commercial orientation” means 
commercial opportunities at its airports are not being leveraged to the fullest (Kachwaha, 
2012; Centre for Aviation, 2014c, p. 3).  
Due to a strong growth in India’s middle class, increasing tourism activity and liberalisation 
of the aviation industry passenger air traffic in the country has grown at an remarkable 
CAGR of more than 10% over the past decade (Bhadra, 2008; Raghunath, 2010; Open 
Government Data Platform India, 2014). Bhadra (2008) states that in 2006 it was estimated 
that the capital required to address airport infrastructure backlogs, with an eye on the 
Commonwealth Games that were hosted in New Delhi in 2010, was US$ 9 billion over the 
following 5 years. According to Mukherjee (2015) investments of US$ 40 to 50 billion are 
required to provide sufficient airport capacity for the projected growth in air traffic up to 
2025. The government has decided to turn to the private sector as a source of necessary 
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funding, as well as for the introduction of much needed efficiency improvements (Ohri, 
2006; Bhadra, 2008; Kachwaha, 2012; Centre for Aviation, 2014b).  
8.2. Concessions 
The very first airport PPP in India took place in 1994, where the concession to build, operate 
and transfer (BOT) a new greenfield airport near Kochi in the state of Kerala was awarded to 
Cochin International Airport Limited (CIAL) (ICAO, 2013d). CIAL is a public limited company 
that was set up by the State Government of Kerala and this project is considered a “pioneer 
of the Indian airport” PPP model (ICAO, 2015). The airport (IATA code: COK) was opened for 
commercial traffic in 1999. Following this project, the government amended its legislation in 
2003 to allow for up to 100% foreign direct investment into greenfield airports. 
In July 2004 the government awarded a 30-year concession (with the option to extend by 
another 30 years) to design, build, own and operate (DBOO) a new greenfield airport near 
Bangalore in Karnataka State to the Bangalore International Airport Limited (BIAL) (ICAO, 
2015). The airport, known as Kempegowda International Airport (IATA code: BLR), was 
opened in May 2008. 
The 30-year DBOO concession (with the option to extend by another 30 years) for a new 
greenfield airport near Hyderabad was awarded in December 2004 to Hyderabad 
International Airport Limited (HIAL) (ICAO, 2015). The airport opened in March 2008 and is 
known as Rajiv Gandhi International Airport (IATA code: HYD). 
In 2006 two brownfield concessions for the country’s two largest airports at Delhi (IATA 
code: DEL) and Mumbai (IATA code: BOM) were awarded following an international 
competitive bidding process (ICAO, 2013d). These 30-year concessions (with the option to 
extend by another 30 years) were awarded to the New Delhi International Airport Limited 
(DIAL) and the Mumbai International Airport Limited (MIAL) respectively.  
The following year a concession for an “aerotropolis” development near Durgapur in the 
state of West Bengal was awarded to the Bengal Aerotropolis Projects Limited (BAPL). The 
greenfield airport known as Kazi Nazrul Islam International Airport (IATA code: RDP) was 
opened in May 2015 (ICAO, 2015).  
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The election of a new government in 2014 ushered in a delay in the award of further PPP 
deals for airports in the country. In September 2013 the AAI had announced six more 
airports were to be privatised, namely Ahmedabad, Chennai, Guwahati, Jaipur, Kolkata and 
Lucknow, and that a further 9 were to follow (Centre for Aviation, 2014c; Poole, 2015). 
However, this proposal was shelved by the new government, as it reconsidered the lessons 
learnt from past privatisations (Centre for Aviation, 2014c; Firstpost, 2014; Mukherjee, 
2015; Poole, 2015). It was announced in December 2015 that instead of awarding long-term 
concessions on a PPP basis, operations and maintenance (O&M) contracts were awarded to 
Singapore’s Changi Airports International for the airports at Ahmedabad and Jaipur 
(Bhattacharya, 2015). The procurement process for two major greenfield developments, 
Navi Mumbai and Goa Mopa, have experienced delays. It is not expected that these PPP 
deals will be concluded during the course of 2016 (Centre for Aviation, 2015b). 
8.3. Role of government 
The government plays various roles in the Indian airport PPPs, ranging from airport operator 
and owner, to concessionaire partner and economic regulator.  
As an operator at DEL and BOM airports, the AAI has transferred operations to the 
concessionaires after 2006, over a period of 3 to 6 months (Jain et al, 2007). The 
concessionaires for these airports, DIAL and MIAL, each have an international airport 
operator on board, Fraport and ACSA respectively, who provide the necessary operational 
expertise. Since the other concessions are all related to greenfield airports, AAI has not been 
involved as an operator there. 
However, from an ownership perspective the AAI plays a role in three of the concessions 
completed so far. The AAI owns a stake of 26% in the DIAL and MIAL consortia, providing it 
with the right to veto certain important decisions (Kachwaha, 2008). Moreover, it holds 13% 
of the equity in the BIAL consortium that operates the BLR greenfield airport in Bangalore. 
These ownership stakes entitle AAI to a flow of dividends from the operations. Further 
government ownership of the successful airport PPP consortia is effected through various 
Union and State government entities: 
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 The Union Government of India owns a 13% stake in HIAL, which operates the HYD 
greenfield airport in Hyderabad; 
 The State Government of Karala is a major shareholder in CIAL and played an 
important role in setting up the innovative financing structure of the Cochin airport 
concession. This will be elaborated on in the section on financing of the various 
airport PPPs.  
 Karnataka State Industrial Investment & Development Corporation Limited (KSIIDC) 
holds a 13% share in BIAL; together with the AAI this brings the government 
ownership of this consortium to 26%. 
 The government has a small stake in the latest greenfield PPP in Durgapur, operated 
by the BAPL consortium. The 1.2% equity stake is owned by the West Bengal 
Industrial Development Corporation, a nodal agency owned by the State 
Government of West Bengal. 
Besides the role of the AAI as airport operator, and the ownership role played by various 
government entities, the government of India plays a key role in the award and regulation of 
the airport PPPs. According to Jain et al (2007) cabinet decided in 2003 to utilise a PPP 
model for the development of DEL and BOM airports and it constituted an Empowered 
Group of Ministers (EGoM) to implement this decision. Further, the Ministry of Civil Aviation 
(MoCA) constituted an Inter-Ministerial Group (IMG) to support the EGoM in the process.  
The MoCA is responsible for policies and programmes relating to the development and 
regulation of civil aviation in India, including overseeing the provision of airport 
infrastructure (Jain et al, 2007). As such, the MoCA with the support of the EGoM and IMG 
developed the bidding documents, the concession agreement (Operation Management and 
Development Agreement, OMDA) and managed the competitive bidding process (Pandey et 
al, 2010). The bidding process was subject to several delays and some controversy relating 
to the evaluation of the technical and financial bids received (Jain et al, 2007). Eventually, in 
January 2006 the GMR-Fraport consortium was allowed to choose which airport concession 
it wanted, and it chose DEL. The concession for BOM was awarded to the GVK-ACSA 
consortium. 
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Interestingly, these concessions were awarded in the absence of a clear regulatory 
framework, which has led to continued debates and disputes between the government and 
the concessionaires (Centre for Aviation, 2014b). The designated economic regulator, the 
Airports Economic Regulatory Authority (AERA) was only constituted in 2009 (Raghunat, 
2010). AERA’s mandate includes the determination of tariffs for aeronautical service fees 
and monitoring of performance of the major airports in the country, with the aim of 
creating a level playing field for all major airports and protecting the interests of airport 
users (AERA, 2015; Singh et al, 2015). Major airports in India are considered those with 
annual passenger traffic of more than 1.5 million (Kachwaha, 2012).  
AERA has adopted price cap regulation, regulating aeronautical service fees such as landing, 
aircraft parking and passenger fees, while leaving non-aeronautical charges such as rent 
unregulated. This is meant to create an incentive for concessionaires to develop strong non-
aeronautical revenues (Pandey, Morris & Raghuram, 2010). AERA uses a single-till approach 
whereby both aeronautical and non-aeronautical revenues are directed to cover 
aeronautical costs (Singh et al, 2015). However, the OMDAs for DEL and BOM that were 
signed before AERA was active stipulate a hybrid-till approach. Singh et al (2015) state that 
under this hybrid-till approach only 30% of non-aeronautical revenues are considered in the 
determination of the aeronautical service tariffs. The remaining 70% of non-aeronautical 
revenues are retained by the concessionaire.  
Representations by various other concessionaires were made to the government, in order to 
have the single-till approach changed to their preferred dual-till approach (Centre for 
Aviation, 2014c). Singh et al (2015) report that AERA reached a compromise with the BIAL 
concessionaire at Bangalore and settled on a hybrid-till approach whereby 40% of non-
aeronautical revenues are directed towards aeronautical costs. It remains to be seen 
whether AERA will shift its approach to price cap regulation and implement hybrid-till 
systems across the board. The Centre for Aviation (2014b) argues that India’s weak 
institutional framework, lack of domain expertise and uncertainty about the future role of 
the AAI contribute to the lack of a predictable and transparent policy environment that is 
required to attract investors to the industry.  
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8.4. Concession parties 
8.4.1. Cochin (COK) 
The first airport PPP in India at Cochin (COK) airport was developed in a somewhat unusual 
manner. Due to budgetary constraints and a desire to improve upon the inefficient public 
operations at the airport, the local government was tasked to redevelop the airport using 
alternative sources of funding. In 1994, the local Cochin administrator, backed by the 
Keralan State government, set up the Cochin International Airport Limited (CIAL) to 
construct, own, operate and maintain the airport (Hooper & Walder, 2001). This company 
then sourced funding from various sources over the next few years, which has resulted in a 
diverse ownership structure. 
The government owns 36% of the equity of CIAL, the majority of which was contributed by 
the Government of Kerala State, a chunk by the Kerala State Industrial Development 
Corporation and minor stakes by various government-supported institutions (Hooper & 
Walder, 2001; Rameshan & Jeyavelu, 2007). Airport service providers, including Air India 
and Bharat Petroleum, own approximately 24% of CIAL’s equity. The majority of the firm’s 
equity is owned by a large group of non-resident Indians from over 25 countries.  
Unsecured debt, guaranteed by the Government of Kerala State, is a major source of finance 
for CIAL. Its total debt burden peaked in FY 2001-2 at Rs 2509 million and has since been 
reduced to Rs 838 million in FY 2004-5 (Rameshan & Jeyavelu, 2007). Several of the airport’s 
service providers have also provided interest free deposits in return for the rights to provide 
certain services at the airport.  
8.4.2. Bangalore (BLR) 
The 30 year concession for the greenfield airport at Bangalore (BLR) was awarded in 2004, 
after the competition attracted 17 bidders and completion of the process took more than 10 
years (Hooper & Walder, 2001). The Bangalore International Airport Limited (BIAL) that won 
the concession is 26% owned by the government, with equal portions being held by the 
Karnataka State Industrial & Infrastructure Development Corporation and the AAI (ICAO, 
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2015). The remaining 74% is owned by the following private parties: GVK Group India (43%), 
Siemens Project Ventures GmbH (26%) and Flughafen Zürich AG Ltd (5%).  
According to Raghunath (2010) early shareholders Larsen & Toubro (an Indian construction 
and technology conglomerate) and Flughafen Zürich sold stakes in BIAL totalling 29% to 
GVK, valuing the company at over US$ 1 billion.  
GVK is a large Indian conglomerate which is active in the energy, resources, infrastructure 
and hospitality sectors. In FY 2014-15 it recorded revenues of over Rs 30 billion 
(approximately US$ 442 million), more than 80% of which was generated by its airport 
activities (GVK, 2015). In addition to BIAL, GVK is active at Mumbai (BOM) and two airports 
in Indonesia. 
Siemens Project Ventures GmbH is a subsidiary of the giant German technology 
conglomerate Siemens AG. The subsidiary invests in the energy, healthcare, industry and 
infrastructure markets, focusing on projects where its parent company can play a major role 
in construction or supply of technology and equipment (Siemens, 2016). 
Besides being the operator of Zürich International Airport in Switzerland since 2000 and its 
stake in the Confins Airport concession in Brazil, Flughafen Zürich is active at 10 airports in 7 
countries in Latin America and Asia (Flughafen Zürich, 2016). 
8.4.3. Hyderabad (HYD) 
Following an international competitive bidding process, the concession for the greenfield 
airport at Hyderabad (HYD) was awarded to the Hyderabad International Airports Limited 
(HIAL), which is 26% owned by the government, through the AAI and the State Government 
of Telangana (or Andra Pradesh) in equal parts. The private parties in the consortium are 
Indian conglomerate GMR (63%) and Malaysia Airports Holding Berhard. 
GMR is a listed Indian conglomerate with activities in energy, transportation and urban 
infrastructure. In FY 2014-15 it had revenues worth over Rs 110 billion (approximately US$ 
1.6 billion) and its airport activites (Hyderabad, Delhi and Mactan–Cebu International 
Airport in the Philippines) accounted for almost half of that.  
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Malaysia Airports Holding Berhard (MAHB) is a listed company, incorporated by the 
Malaysian Government in 1991, that manages 39 airports in Malaysia, one in Turkey and 
one in India. According to its website it also provides airport management services to two 
airports in Cambodia.  
8.4.4. Delhi (DEL) 
The concessions for both Delhi (DEL) and Mumbai (BOM) airports were awarded through an 
international competitive bidding process, initiated by the government in 2004. Nine 
consortia were pre-qualified, five submitted bids for DEL and six for BOM. 
According to Jain et al (2007) the conditions of the bidding process stipulated that foreign 
shareholding of the consortia was limited to 49% and restrictions were placed on 
shareholding by airlines. For both airports the AAI would hold 26% of the equity in the 
concession companies. Participation of an experienced airport operator with at least 10% 
stake in the consortium was a requirement in stipulated in the Operation Management and 
Development Agreement (OMDA). In addition to the OMDA a State Government Support 
Agreement was to be put in place, providing a commitment of support by the respective 
State Governments for the concessionaires in terms of land development, surface access, 
utilities, safety and security (Jain et al, 2007). This obligation of the government to support 
the airport PPPs is considered a unique feature that is not seen in other countries and in 
other industries’ PPP deals (Kachwaha, 2012).   
The concessions would be awarded to the bidders, meeting the minimum requirements 
stipulated, with the highest percentage of revenue offered as a concession fee. After errors 
in the bid evaluation and several disputes the concession for DEL was awarded to the GMR-
Fraport consortium in January 2006 (Jain et al, 2007). The lead partner GMR holds 64% in 
the concession company Delhi International Airport Limited (DIAL) and German airport 
operator Fraport holds 10%. At the time of the award 10% of the concession company was 
held by Malaysia Airports (Niaga) Sdn Bhd, a subsidiary of MAHB, but this stake was sold to 
GMR in 2015 for an amount of US$ 80 million (ICAO, 2015).  
Fraport has managed Germany’s largest airport, Frankfurt Main, since its opening in 1936 
and manages nine additional airports in Europe, Asia and South America. Fraport was listed 
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on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange in 2001 and is majority owned by the Government of the 
State of Hesse (31%) and the City of Frankfurt (20%) (Fraport, 2016).  
8.4.5. Mumbai (BOM) 
The concession for Mumbai (BOM) was awarded to a consortium led by GVK (50.5%) and 
two South African parties, namely airport operator ACSA (10%) and investment company 
Bidvest (13.5%). The remaining 26% of equity in Mumbai International Airport Limited 
(MIAL) is held by the AAI. 
ACSA is a state-owned company that operates nine of South Africa’s largest international 
airports and holds a stake in Guarulhos airport in São Paulo, Brazil.  
Bidvest is listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange and reported revenues of more than 
ZAR 200 billion (approximately US$ 12.5 billion) in 2015 (Bidvest, 2016). The South African 
Public Investment Corporation (PIC), which manages the pension funds of government 
employees, holds substantial stakes in both Bidvest (approximately 15%) and ACSA (20%).  
8.4.6. Durgapur (RDP) 
The concession for the greenfield Durgapur (RDP) airport was awarded to Bengal 
Aerotropolis Projects Limited (BAPL), a private consortium with no AAI ownership, in 2007. 
The only government involvement in this consortium is a 1.2% ownership stake by the West 
Bengal Industrial Development Corporation. The majority shareholder in BAPL is Changi 
Airports India, a subsidiary of Singaporean airport operator Changi Airports.  
The Indian infrastructure, construction and finance firm IL&FS holds a 12.7% equity stake in 
BAPL. The firm was incorporated by three Indian government entities, the Central Bank of 
India, the Unit Trust of India and the Housing Development Finance Corporation in 1987, 
and has since diversified its ownership structure. In 2014 IL&FS generated revenues of over 
Rs 15 billion (approximately US$ 220 million).  
The remaining 53.9% equity of BAPL is held in equal parts by four companies linked to three 
main promoters of the project, each with experience in related fields such as infrastructure 
and financial services (IACO, 2015).  
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8.4.7. Overview of concession parties 
The PPP for COK came about in somewhat unusual manner, whereby the government set up 
and promoted the concession company and then sourced funds from a variety of sources. 
Most interestingly, it was able to tap into the savings of diaspora as a major source of 
finance – a method akin to diaspora bonds.  
The major greenfield and brownfield PPPs that took place between 2004 and 2007 all 
attracted international airport operations expertise, in the form of large, foreign airport 
operators (Flughafen Zürich, Malaysia Airports, Fraport, ACSA and Changi).  
As was observed in the case of Brazil, large domestic conglomerates and infrastructure firms 
also play a key role in each of the PPPs (GVK, GMR, and IL&FS). These firms bring experience 
in managing infrastructure concessions, dealing with governments and financial acumen to 
the developments.  
Finally, the government, through AAI and various (State) development agencies holds stakes 
in each of the airport PPPs. The main modus is 26% government ownership of the 
concession company, either through AAI alone, or in combination with the local state 
government.  
8.5. Concession financials 
Unlike the other concessions, the COK concession does not require CIAL to pay a concession 
fee to the government. The government (AAI) does receive dividends from the company 
proportional to its equity ownership. It is not clear whether the concessionaire for this 
airport is entitled to impose any additional charges, over and above the standard (regulated) 
aeronautical service fees. 
For the other airport PPPs in India, the concessionaires pay a concession fee to the AAI 
based on a specified percentage of gross revenue (Centre for Aviation, 2014c). At the two 
greenfield airports at Bangalore and Hyderabad the concessionaires pay 4% of gross 
revenue to AAI (Nayar, 2012). At the two brownfield PPPs in Delhi and Mumbai the 
concessionaires won the bidding process by offering 45.99% and 38.7% of gross revenue 
respectively (Jain et al, 2007; Kachwaha, 2012). The concession fee for the greenfield PPP at 
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Durgapur is not known. The Centre for Aviation (2014c) reports that the AAI has received 
US$ 1.7 billion in revenue share from the airport PPPs since FY 2007. 
The concessionaires at the latest airport PPPs are entitled to charge a User Development 
Fee (UDF), which is set by AERA (Sinha, 2013). This UDF provides an additional source of 
revenue for the airports and is also subject to the revenue sharing arrangement with the 
AAI. However, in light of the high level of revenue sharing at DEL and BOM airports, the 
concessionaires appealed this. The government conceded in favour of the concessionaires 
and changed the UDF to an Airport Development Fee (ADF), which is not subject to revenue 
sharing (Pandey et al, 2010). It was later reported that the government would not entertain 
such changes in future, arguing that the airport users “should not be burdened by high 
charges” (Sinha, 2013).  
For each of the airports the concessionaires are required to carry out certain upgrade and 
expansion projects, with specified deadlines and penalties for late completion (Jain et al, 
2007; Pandey et al, 2010). Beyond the immediate mandatory investments, the development 
of the airports will be based on a master plan with clearly defined triggers for expansions. 
Table 8-1 provides an overview of the estimated costs of the first phase of upgrades and 
expansions at each of the airports (besides Durgapur on which no information is available).  
Table 8-1: Overview of concession fees and first phase capital expenditures (from: Raghunath, 2010) 
Airport Location Type 
Passenger 
traffic 2014 
Concession Fee 
Investments 
required 
   (MAP) (% of revenue) (US$ million) 
COK Cochin Greenfield 6.1 N/A 60 
BLR Bangalore Greenfield 14.5 4% 695 
HYD Hyderabad Greenfield 9.8 4% 500 
DEL Delhi Brownfield 39.8 45.99% 3800 
BOM Mumbai Brownfield 35.0 38.7% 3500 
 
Given the considerable mandatory capital outlays, concessionaires have had to provide 
evidence of their ability to raise sufficient capital, through parent companies and 
commercial debt (Jain et al, 2007). This was considered particularly important as external 
funding cannot be secured against the airport land and aeronautical assets (e.g. runways, 
taxiways and terminal buildings). Securitisation of the land and aeronautical assets is not 
allowed as it can provide unwanted encumbrances to takeover of the assets by the 
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government upon expiry of the concession agreements (Pandey et al, 2010; Raghunath, 
2010).  
According to Kachwaha (2008; 2012) the “commercial backbone” of the latest airport PPPs 
(i.e. excluding Cochin) is a considerable piece of airport land that is made available to the 
concessionaire for development, free of charge. These land areas, for example 5% of the 
total in Delhi and 10% in Mumbai, represent significant value as the airports are located 
within the highly congested city areas (Pandey et al, 2010). The concessionaires are 
expected to develop this land for commercial (non-aeronautical) activities such as hotels, 
business parks, malls and the like, which would be transferred to the AAI upon expiry of the 
concession. Concessionaires will be reimbursed for the transfer of these assets at their fair 
market value at the time, minus the value of the land (Pandey et al, 2010).  
8.6. GDP and air traffic 
From the literature review we know that air traffic is a major factor in the bankability of 
airport PPPs and that GDP is an important driver for air traffic. A minimum of 1 MAP is often 
cited as the boundary for profitability for airports (Foster & Briceño-Garmendia, 2010; ICAO, 
2013b). Private investors in airport infrastructure will consider the level of air traffic at an 
airport, as well as the historic and forecast growth thereof.  
As shown in Figure 8-1 passenger air traffic in India has grown substantially over the last 
decade, reaching a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 10%. Bhadra (2008) and 
Raghunath (2010) argue that a growing Indian middle class, increasing tourism activity and 
liberalisation of the aviation industry have been important drivers for the growth in air 
traffic. Figure 8-2 shows how growth in GDP and air traffic have largely moved together, 
reaching a post-financial crisis peak in FY 2011. 
The three greenfield airport concessions (COK, BLR and HYD) all took over from existing 
airports in the vicinity and therefore did not start operations with zero passenger traffic. 
Figure 8-3 shows that each of these airports has reported passenger traffic well over 1 
million and consistently strong growth. COK achieved an impressive CAGR of more than 13% 
over the last decade, while BLR and HYD have both grown at approximately 6% CAGR since 
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the start of operations in 2008. Unfortunately, no traffic data on the greenfield RDP airport 
is available. 
The two brownfield airport concessions involve India’s two busiest airports, DEL and BOM. 
Both of these airports have seen their passenger traffic decrease in only two of the last 10 
years. In that same period BOM achieved a CAGR of more than 7% while DEL has overtaken 
it with a CAGR of more than 10%. 
High traffic figures and strong growth have contributed to the keen interest shown by the 
private sector in the airport PPPs in India. According to the Centre for Aviation (2014b) 
passenger traffic in India is expected to continue its growth, reaching a total of 472 million 
passengers in FY 2032, making it the third largest aviation market in the world, behind the 
USA and China. However, it notes that improvements in the regulatory and policy 
environment are necessary preconditions to achieving this. 
 
Figure 8-1: Total passenger air traffic in India (from: Open Government Data Platform India, 2014 and DGCA, 2015) 
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Figure 8-2: Change in GDP and air traffic in India (from: World Bank, 2015b; Open Government Data Platform India, 2014 
and DGCA, 2015) 
 
 
Figure 8-3: Passenger air traffic at greenfield airports (from: ACI, 2015) 
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Figure 8-4: Passenger air traffic at brownfield airports (from: ACI, 2015) 
8.7. Outcomes and findings 
The Indian airport PPPs are generally hailed as a success, citing the significant infrastructure 
improvements, awards won by the various airports and continued appetite from the private 
sector for further privatisations (Nayar, 2012; Singh et al, 2015). However, the privatisation 
process has not been faultless and several issues have been raised. 
According to Somaia (2015) most of the aviation value chain in India has been struggling for 
profitability in recent years, due to the weak regulatory framework, high fuel prices and 
over capacity in the airline sector. Indeed, Pandey et al (2010) reported already in 2010 that 
the heads of concessionaire partners GVK and GMR have asked the government for an 
increase in tariffs, citing a drop in domestic passenger traffic and a struggling real estate 
market as reasons for their requests. However, these requests were denied at the time in 
order to avoid putting further pressure on the airlines. Nevertheless, Firstpost (2014) and 
Mukherjee (2015) report that airlines and governments are unhappy with tariff increases 
that have occurred at DEL (increase of 346%) and BOM (increase of 164%) in recent years. 
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Some consider the charges levied by the concessionaires on the airport users to be 
excessive and have claimed the privatised Indian airports are amongst the world’s most 
expensive (Sinha, 2013; Singh et al, 2015; The Indian Express, 2015). According to the Centre 
for Aviation (2015b) AREA is now intending to reduce the aeronautical charges at DEL by 
78%. These issues show that the economic regulation the airport PPPs operate under has 
not been entirely effective in protecting stakeholders from monopolistic behaviour by 
airports.  
Jain et al (2007) describe how all AAI staff employed at the brownfield airports would be 
retained by the concessionaire for at least three years. Employees would have to be made 
offers by the concessionaires that are “no less beneficial than the current arrangement” 
(Jain et al, 2007, p. 7). However, it seems that the transition of employment from AAI to 
private sector has not been completely successful. The Airports Authority of India 
Employees' Union (AAIEU) has claimed that the terms offered by the private concessionaires 
were not acceptable and that many AAI employees were “displaced” (Sharma, 2015). 
Moreover, the report claims that staff have had to vacate houses on airport land as they 
were demolished to make way for new developments. These labour issues have led to the 
AAIEU threatening to strike in order to stop the government from moving ahead with 
further privatisations (The Indian Express, 2015; Sharma, 2015).  
The AAI manages 125 airports, 90% of which are not profitable and require substantial 
investments in upgrades and expansions (Centre for Aviation, 2015b). According to Jha 
(2015) the revenue share from PPP airports accounts for a third of the AAI’s income. This 
income enables the AAI to support its loss-making operations and necessary capital outlays. 
However, AERA’s intention to reduce the aeronautical fees charged at the PPP airports 
could see the AAI’s income from revenue sharing decline substantially (Centre for Aviation, 
2015b). In addition, if more of the AAI’s large, profitable airports are privatised (such as 
Chennai and Kolkata) the revenue share levels are likely to be lower than those at Delhi and 
Mumbai, putting further pressure on the AAI’s income. One of the AAI’s other sources of 
income, the provision of air traffic management services, is also at risk as the government 
considers spinning off this part of its operations into a separate entity (Centre for Aviation, 
2015b). It is clear that the significant changes in the airport sector in India impact the AAI 
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and its revenue model. For the purpose of the development of the sector, including both the 
international PPP airports and the loss-making domestic airports, the AAI’s role and strategy 
will have to be reconsidered. 
8.8. Discussion 
The recent airport PPPs in India have demonstrated the importance of effective government 
regulation and policies. The PPP procurement process encountered several irregularities and 
the economic regulation of the airport PPPs was implemented late, which has led to 
uncertainty and turmoil in the airports sector.  
The weakness in regulatory framework has also led to criticism of the fees charged by the 
private airport operators. Further, the privatisation process has given rise to labour 
disputes. These are signs that the government has gone through a steep learning curve 
during this process. It is hoped that lessons are learnt, institutional capacity has grown and 
airport development in the country will be see improvements. A rethink of the role and 
business model of the AAI is required, as its operating environment has changed drastically.  
On the bright side, the privatisation process has led to significant increases in capacity and 
improvements in quality at some of the country’s major airports. The two brownfield and 
three greenfield concessions have brought in significant private capital and expertise, 
including the involvement of internationally experienced airport operators. Two large Indian 
conglomerates, GVK and GMR, have emerged as dominant players in the sector. 
Strong economic performance and growth in passenger traffic have been key to enabling 
the private sector investment in airports. For these reasons it is likely that investor 
confidence will remain, provided the government implements lessons learnt and moves 
forward with airport development in a suitable modus.  
8.9. Lessons learnt for financing airport developments in SSA 
As was the case in Brazil, the Indian airport privatisations have relied heavily on domestic 
finance. This confirms the importance for SSA governments in considering the availability of 
various sources of finance to the private sectors.  
Research Report 
 
 
Marcel Langeslag  77 
The role of the government in developing, owning and operating airport infrastructure in 
the post-privatisation industry is also a key lesson to be learnt from the Indian airport PPPs. 
The AAI has seen both its sources of income and its investment needs change drastically. It 
would be sensible for SSA governments to consider the implications of airport PPPs on the 
funding of unprofitable infrastructure in the country when implementing airport PPPs.  
Finally, an interesting takeaway for SSA governments from the Indian case study is the 
possibility of accessing diaspora funds for airport developments. Since the privatisation of 
COK airport in the mid-nineties there have been considerable developments in the use 
diaspora funds that may provide opportunities to financing airport developments in SSA.  
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9. Interview Results and Analysis 
9.1. Introduction 
In order to obtain primary data on the views of SSA governments towards using PPPs for 
airport developments, in-depth interviews with government representatives were 
conducted. These interviews were informed by the case studies of Brazil and India 
presented in the previous chapter. 
This chapter describes the data collection and content analysis, and presents the findings 
from this research.  
9.2. Data Collection and Respondents 
Suitable respondents were sought from the countries selected in the Research Design and 
Methodology and approached with a request to participate in this study. Only two 
respondents were found to be willing and available to participate. The respondents are 
introduced in the following sections.  
Interviews with these respondents were conducted by the researcher and took place via 
telephone (Respondent 1 in Kenya) and face-to-face (Respondent 2 in South Africa). The 
interview guideline in Appendix A was used to inform the topics that were addressed in the 
interviews. The interviews were recorded in full and transcribed for the purpose of analysis. 
9.2.1. Respondent 1: Kenya 
The first respondent in this research is an Independent Director of the KAA who has been in 
this position since April 2015. He chairs the Finance and Investment, Private Investment and 
Strategy Committees of the Board of the KAA. His background is in finance, having worked 
as a banker and being involved in several PPP projects in the social infrastructure sector in 
Kenya. 
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9.2.2. Respondent 2: South Africa 
The second respondent is the Director of Aviation Economic Analysis and Regulation at the 
National Department of Transport. He has worked in the aviation sector for more than 10 
years and was previously in charge of airport infrastructure at the Department of Transport.  
9.3. Background 
In order to provide context to the interview results, the following sections provide an 
overview of the airports industry in Kenya and South Africa. This overview addresses the 
organisational and legislative state of affairs in the industry, any past experiences with 
airport PPPs in the country and the situation around air traffic and GDP. 
9.3.1. Kenya 
Kenya is located on the equator in East Africa and is a founding member of the East African 
Community (EAC). According to the World Bank (2015b) in 2014 it had a population of 
approximately 45 million and a GDP per capita of US$ 1,358 classifying it as a lower middle 
income country.  
Oversight and regulation of the civil aviation industry, including the provision of air traffic 
navigation services as well as economic regulation of air services, is provided by the Kenya 
Civil Aviation Authority (KCAA), which was established in 2002 (KCAA, 2016a).  
The airports system in the country is managed and developed by the Kenya Airports 
Authority (KAA), which was established as an autonomous body in 1991. KAA manages four 
international airports, four domestic airports and two airstrips (KAA, 2016a). The two main 
international airports are Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (IATA code: NBO) in Nairobi 
and Moi International Airport (IATA code: MBA) in Mombasa, which together account for 
approximately 90% of all passenger traffic in Kenya. There are several other airports and 
airstrips in Kenya that are owned and operated by local governments but these receive no 
scheduled flights and very little passenger traffic.  
As shown in Figure 9-1 total air passenger traffic at the KAA airports and airstrips has grown 
from almost 6 MAP in 2005 to more than 8.5 MAP in 2014, which represents a CAGR of 
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approximately 4% (KAA, 2012; KCAA, 2014). Figure 9-2 illustrates the movement of GDP 
growth and passenger air traffic growth. The contraction of passenger traffic in 2012 and 
2013 has been attributed by commentators to the upsurge in violent terrorist attacks in the 
country.  
The KAA reported revenues of KES 3.2 billion (approximately US$ 32 million) in 2014, which 
was split into 78% aeronautical and 22% non-aeronautical.  
PPP projects in the country are assessed and approved by a dedicated PPP Committee, 
which is supported in its functions by the PPP Unit (PPP Unit, 2016). The PPP Unit (2016) 
quotes a capital requirement of US$ 4 billion per year over the next decade for the 
development of the country’s infrastructure as an important reason for prioritising PPPs in 
infrastructure.  
 
Figure 9-1: Total passenger air traffic at KAA airports (from: KAA, 2012 and KCAA, 2014) 
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Figure 9-2: Change in GDP and air traffic in Kenya (from: KAA, 2012; KCAA, 2014 and World Bank, 2015b) 
9.3.2. South Africa 
South Africa is located at the southernmost end of the African continent and is a member of 
the Southern African Development Community (SADC). In 2014 it had a population of 54 
million and a GDP per capita of US$ 6,483 classifying it as an upper middle income country 
(World Bank, 2015b).  
Aviation in the country is regulated by the National Department of Transport and one of its 
agencies, the South African Civil Aviation Authority (SACAA). The SACAA is responsible for 
safety and security oversight for the civil aviation sector. Economic regulation is provided by 
the Regulatory Committee within the National Department of Transport. 
In 1993 the Airports Company South Africa (ACSA) was established to own and operate the 
country’s nine major airports (ACSA, 2016). ACSA is majority owned by the South African 
Government, through the National Department of Transport, while the Public Investment 
Corporation (PIC), which manages the pension funds of government employees, holds a 20% 
stake. According to ICAO (2013e, p. 1) ACSA is a financially independent commercial entity, 
operating “at arm’s length” from the government. The nine ACSA airports and their 2014 
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passenger traffic are listed in Table 9-1. Figure 9-3 shows the total passenger traffic at the 
ACSA airports over the last decade and Figure 9-4 shows the change in passenger traffic in 
relation to the country’s GDP growth. From 2005 to 2014 the passenger traffic at the nine 
ACSA airports achieved a modest CAGR of 2%.  
In 2014 ACSA reported ZAR 7.1 billion in revenues, 64% of which was attributed to 
aeronautical activities and 36% to non-aeronautical activities.  
Table 9-1: Passenger traffic in 2014 at ACSA airports (source: ACI, 2015) 
Airport Location IATA Code Million Annual 
Passengers (MAP) 
O.R. Tambo International Airport Johannesburg JNB 19.2 
Cape Town International Airport Cape Town CPT 8.6 
King Shaka International Airport Durban DUR 4.5 
Port Elizabeth International Airport Port Elizabeth PLZ 1.3 
Bram Fischer International Airport Bloemfontein BFN 0.4 
Upington International Airport Upington UTN 0.07 
East London Airport East London ELS 0.6 
George Airport George GRJ 0.6 
Kimberley Airport Kimberley KIM 0.2 
 
According to the Department of Transport (2015a) there are 135 licensed and 
approximately 1600 unlicensed airports in South Africa. Out of the licensed airports, 9 are 
owned by ACSA, 5 by provincial governments, 75 by local (municipal) governments and 46 
are privately owned. The vast majority of these privately owned airports are small airstrips, 
mainly used for flight schools and leisure activities such as micro-lights and skydiving. 
Approximately 86% of passenger traffic is facilitated through the ACSA airports. Outside 
these nine airports the majority of passenger traffic takes place at the privately owned 
Lanseria International Airport and Kruger Mpumalanga International Airport (Department of 
Transport, 2015a).  
Lanseria International Airport was established in 1974 as a municipal airport and was 
privatised in 1991 (Venter, 2016). Passenger traffic at the airport reportedly grew from 
150,000 in 2005 to more than 1 million in 2010. The airport is owned by a consortium 
consisting of the PIC, infrastructure investment firm Pan African Investment Corporation 
and local investment firm Nozala (LACDC, 2016).  
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Kruger Mpumalanga International Airport was established as a privately-owned airport in 
2002 by Primkop Airport Management (Pty) Ltd. The airport handled approximately 250,000 
passengers in 2014 (ACI, 2015). 
The third significant private airport in South Africa is the Hendrik Van Eck Airport in 
Phalaborwa. This airport was originally owned by resources firm Foskor, who sold it to 
(privately owned) local airline SA Airlink (SA Airlink, 2016). It is the only airline operating 
flights to this airport, which mainly serves tourists visiting the Kruger National Park.  
According to the White Paper on National Civil Aviation Policy (Department of Transport, 
2015b) the funding of provincial airports is perceived to be a challenge for the government. 
Nevertheless, it states there are presently “no specific incentives for investing in airports” 
(p. 38) and that “financial viability is a prerequisite for private-sector involvement” (p. 39).  
 
 
Figure 9-3: Total passenger air traffic at ACSA airports (from: ACI, 2015) 
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Figure 9-4: Change in GDP and air traffic in South Africa (from: ACI, 2015 and World Bank, 2015b) 
9.4. Content Analysis 
The interviews were analysed in accordance with the process outline in the Research Design 
and Methodology chapter. After transcribing and familiarising the interviews were coded to 
provide an insight into the contents. The coding tree used for this contains attribute codes 
and substantive codes and is included in Appendix B. Through conceptualisation and 
interrelation several themes were identified that related to the theoretical basis of this 
research and the case studies conducted. Interpretation of the themes and the viewpoints 
within them expressed by the respondents resulted in the findings that are presented in the 
following section.  
9.5. Findings 
The findings presented in this section relate the interview content to the theoretical 
background established in the literature review and the emerging market context outlined 
in the case studies. They highlight similarities and differences between the countries of the 
two respondents, Kenya and South Africa. The following results of the content analysis of 
the interviews and are organised according to the themes identified. 
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9.5.1. Financing of airport developments: budget finance and the funding gap 
Respondent 1 indicated that the KAA receives US$ 20 million in budget allocation from the 
government for the development of infrastructure at the country’s small air strips. 
Developments at its main airports (NBO and MBA) are financed through loans from 
Development Finance Institutions (DFIs). The KAA is able to borrow from some of the DFIs 
without a sovereign guarantee, as one of the few parastatal organisations in Kenya, because 
it has significant revenues. For example, in 2010 it borrowed US$ 93 million from the French 
Development Agency (Agence Française de Développement, AFD) for terminal building 
works at NBO, and in 2014 it borrowed US$ 66 million for upgrades at MBA (KAA, 2016b). 
Respondent 1 indicated KAA is currently in discussions with AFD about financing the 
development of the “Original Ring” at NBO, which includes Terminal 1A, 1B and a new 
arrivals terminal. The respondent said the infrastructure gap in Kenya was estimated at KES 
130 to 200 billion (approximately US$ 1.3 to 2.0 billion) per annum and argued that PPPs 
could be utilised to plug this gap.  
In South Africa, ACSA is able to access a variety of sources of finance for capital 
expenditures, including loans from DFIs and the issuance of bonds. Respondent 2 indicated 
that within the ACSA network, income from the large, profitable airports is used to subsidise 
loss-making operations at the smaller airports. The Provincial and Municipal airports in the 
country rely on budget finance from their owners and incidental support from other 
government entities for capital expenditures. The Provincial and Municipal Governments 
are mostly able to allocate sufficient funds to these airports in order to support the role 
they play in providing connectivity in the region. Respondent 2 indicated that many of these 
airports rely on government budget allocations for 70% up to 100% of their financing needs, 
excluding major capital expenditures. The funding gap for airport infrastructure in South 
Africa exists outside of the profitable segment of the market, which is dominated by ACSA 
and the private Lanseria International Airport. This means private participation in the 
financing of developments of these airports is not likely, which echoes the government’s 
position expressed in the White Paper on National Civil Aviation Policy (Department of 
Transport, 2015b).  
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9.5.2. Role of government: legislation, institutional capacity, and investability 
issues 
In Kenya the process of procuring PPP deals is driven by the State Government, through the 
PPP Unit. This PPP Unit organises the procurement of PPP projects according to a list of 
priority projects set up by various government agencies and approved by Cabinet. 
Respondent 1 indicated that the PPP legislation in the country has been criticised as 
cumbersome and impractical, noting that all PPP deals over US$ 10 million have to be 
approved by Cabinet. Unsolicited proposals for PPPs can only be entertained by the PPP 
Unit under very specific circumstances. However, it was highlighted that a successful airport 
PPP deal for a number of small airstrips in the Masai Mara region had been concluded by 
the Narok County Government.  
In South Africa, unsolicited proposals for airport PPPs can be entertained by the National 
Department of Transport and will be considered on a case by case basis by the Airport 
Coordinating Committee. Several of such proposals, for greenfield airports, have been 
received but to date none have been concluded. Similarly to Kenya, Provincial and Municipal 
governments have the authority to conclude airport PPP deals by themselves, subject to 
compliance with applicable legislation. For example, airport management concessions (a 
“light” form of airport PPPs that does not involve private financing) have been granted at 
three municipally owned airports that operate domestic flights only.  
Both Respondents noted that a lack of capacity and understanding of airport PPPs within 
governments is a limiting factor for their implementation. Many governments in SSA do not 
have sufficient knowledge of the complicated risk sharing and financing arrangements for 
airport PPPs and are therefore not able to develop and utilise legislation to support private 
participation. Respondent 1 was of the opinion that support from government, in the form 
of sovereign guarantees, would be required for the successful implementation of airport 
PPPs in Kenya, but was sceptical whether such support would be forthcoming. He stated 
that the government has many competing needs and cannot simply “plug the gap in the 
financial model for a private entity”. Respondent 2 argued that many SSA governments do 
not apply “commercial thinking” when it comes to infrastructure development. This 
corresponds to the comments by the Centre for Aviation (2014c) about the AAI’s lack of 
Research Report 
 
 
Marcel Langeslag  87 
ability to develop non-aeronautical revenues, and the absence of “economic signals” in 
government highlighted by Grimsey & Lewis (2007).  
According to Respondent 1 valuable lessons can be learnt from the energy sector in Kenya, 
which has been highly successful and has seen “several independent power producers come 
on stream with significant capacity”. He describes how policy certainty, a simplified 
regulatory framework, an established feed-in tariff and strong expertise (in both public and 
private sector) on financing energy PPPs have contributed to this success. 
Respondent 2 further argued that “thinking is more politically inclined” in SSA and that 
“political cycles” (i.e. elections) provide obstacles to private participation in airport 
development. This relates to the broader issue of low investability in emerging markets, 
which can be considered an impairment to (foreign) investment. Respondent 1 lists 
“uncertainty on aviation policy”, macro-economic issues, questionable legal protection for 
investors and vulnerability of the Kenyan economy to external shocks (such as the recent 
Ebola virus disease outbreak and violent terrorist attacks) as risk factors for investors in 
airport infrastructure. Investability may be more of a concern for Kenya, a lower middle 
income country, than it is for South Africa, an upper middle income country with a larger 
economy and more developed capital markets. The issues of policy certainty, institutional 
framework and domain expertise were also cited as concerns in India (Centre for Aviation, 
2014b).  
9.5.3. Air traffic: limitations and risks 
Respondent 1 argued that any investor in airport PPPs in the country (referring mainly to 
NBO) would require the level of traffic at the airport to be guaranteed by the government. 
In essence, he believed private investors would not be willing to accept the demand risk 
associated with passenger traffic and would insist on a minimum traffic guarantee from the 
government (i.e. a sovereign guarantee). The respondent considered it highly unlikely that 
such a guarantee would be provided by the government, as it presents a major downside 
risk that the government would want to offload to the private sector in the PPP structure.  
A concessionaire taking on an airport PPP relies on sufficient passenger traffic to generate 
revenues, which will enable it to repay its investors. The confidence of debt providers in 
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particular that the level of air traffic can be sustained and grown over time is believed, by 
Respondent 1, to be insufficient to make airport PPPs in Kenya bankable. Air traffic in the 
country is exposed to various risks, including the reliance on the national airline Kenya 
Airways (which is responsible for more than 70% of traffic in the country), the threat of 
terrorist activity and the Ebola virus disease. Respondent 2 adds that (changes to) visa 
regulations also present a risk to air traffic.  
The situation in South Africa is quite different from that in Kenya. Respondent 2 believes 
that its more diverse economy and the hub role that the country plays for air traffic in Africa 
provide it with a higher level of surety. Even if the situation in South Africa itself were to 
suppress air traffic demand, the demand created by links with neighbouring countries and 
the rest of the continent would mitigate the impact for its airports. It should be noted here 
that air traffic growth in South Africa has been rather lacklustre in the past decade, with a 
CAGR of approximately 2%. Meanwhile, other hub airports in the continent, particularly in 
East Africa, have grown faster than South Africa’s main international hub O.R. Tambo 
International Airport (JNB) in Johannesburg. Nevertheless, JNB is still by far the largest 
airport in the continent and South Africa still the largest aviation market. Respondent 2 
points to recent proposals by private parties to set up greenfield airports, serving as 
secondary airports in the vicinity of JNB and Cape Town International Airport, as a sign of 
investor confidence. He points out that the fact no such PPP deals have been concluded to 
date owes more to risks associated with foreign investment in airports operating 
international flights, than to traffic risks perceived by the investors. 
The fact that the majority of air traffic in South Africa occurs at the ACSA airports means 
that there is very limited air traffic demand left outside of that network. Referring to this 
situation, respondent 2 asked “who will come and invest in anything outside of our current 
airport network”? Moreover, the respondent stated that ACSA would be the government’s 
first point of call if the need for a new airport would arise. This shows that the 
corporatisation of the country’s main airports network, in a state-owned entity, means that 
there is very little opportunity left for private participation in the development of (other) 
airports.  
Research Report 
 
 
Marcel Langeslag  89 
9.5.4. PPP structures, private concession parties and foreign investment 
When asked about the private parties that could play a role in airport PPPs in Kenya, 
Respondent 1 referred to a number of international airport operators. This indicates that 
bringing in operational expertise is seen as one of the objectives of airport PPPs, as was the 
case in Brazil and India. In South Africa however, the presence of ACSA, the largest airport 
operator on the continent, means there is no need to bring in operational expertise from 
outside. In fact, ACSA has exported its expertise to airport PPPs in Brazil and India. In 
addition, three of South Africa’s municipally owned airports have awarded management 
contracts to a private airport operator, which is considered a “light” form of PPPs that does 
not involved private financing. Respondent 1 indicated that such lighter forms of PPPs could 
be considered in Kenya, as they limit the risk exposure of the private sector party. There can 
also be a role for (private) airlines to play in airport PPPs (as in the case of Phalaborwa 
Airport), although there are risks associated with vertical integration in a monopolistic 
environment.  
Besides operational expertise, other areas such as non-aeronautical revenue development 
may benefit from private sector involvement. However, there are other ways, besides PPPs, 
of brining in necessary (private sector) expertise for the development of airport revenues. 
Consultants can fill gaps in expertise in airport organisations, and joint ventures in 
commercial activities (such as real estate development) can be effective in growing non-
aeronautical revenues of airports.  
In addition to airport operational and commercial expertise, airport PPPs require parties 
with capabilities in construction and the management of government concession 
agreements. In both Brazil and India it was seen that large domestic conglomerates played 
an important role in airport PPPs. The South African conglomerate Bidvest was also involved 
in the airport concession for DEL in India. These type and scale of conglomerates may not be 
present in the smaller economies in SSA, which could limit the possibilities for domestic 
involvement in airport PPPs. 
From the financing point of view, Respondent 1 would look towards foreign investors, while 
Respondent 2 also mentioned domestic sources. This may be due to the fact that Kenya is a 
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lower middle income country with a small economy and capital market, while South Africa is 
an upper middle income country with a much larger economy. It is worth noting that the 
GDP (at market prices) of Brazil is almost 7 times larger than that of South Africa, which 
itself is almost 6 times larger than that of Kenya (World Bank, 2015b).  
In Brazil, also an upper middle income country, most of the financing of the airport PPPs 
came from domestic sources, including (government) pension funds. In South Africa the PIC 
has invested in both ACSA and the private Lanseria International Airport, which shows the 
benefits of mobilising (government) pension funds for infrastructure investment. The COK 
airport concession in India (initiated in 1994) was able to mobilise funds from non-resident 
Indians, which is an innovative way of attracting foreign investment that could be 
considered by low or lower middle income countries in SSA.  
Further to the discussion about whether there is a need for foreign investment, Respondent 
2 highlighted that there are security risks involved in foreign investment in airports. This 
may be particularly important for airports with international flights, as they provide a 
gateway into and out of the country. This was cited as one of the reasons a proposed 
greenfield airport PPP did not materialise. 
In addition to security concerns, Respondent 2 indicated that an over-reliance on (foreign) 
private parties in the industry presents a risk to governments. As private sector wages are 
often higher than those in the public sector, a transfer of knowledge and skills from public 
to private sector could take place. This would put the public sector in a disadvantaged 
position in terms of regulation and oversight of the private parties operating in the industry. 
Finally, Respondent 2 described private investors as “profit maximisers”, highlighting the 
need for regulation and oversight of airport PPPs. He described how the objectives of the 
private sector (maximising profit) do not align with those of the public sector (providing 
effective connectivity at reasonable prices). This issue relates to the concerns that have 
been expressed in India about excessive aeronautical fees and labour issues at the privatised 
airports. In essence, the issues arises as some airport services are inherently natural 
monopolies, which require economic regulation to protect airport users and the general 
public (Tretheway, 2001; Oum, Zhang & Zhang, 2004; Czerny & Zhang, 2015).  
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10. Conclusions 
From the research conducted several conclusions can be drawn that provide answers to the 
research questions. In short, it was found that PPPs can certainly play a role in supporting 
airport developments in SSA. However, from a review of the literature, in-depth case studies 
of Brazil and India and interviews with government representatives in two SSA countries, a 
richer view on the opportunities for airport PPPs in SSA has emerged.  
Twelve airport PPPs in Brazil and India have been implemented in recent years, with mostly 
positive outcomes in terms of improvements in airport infrastructure and service levels. 
Also in South Africa, PPPs have successfully been used to develop airport infrastructure and 
improve connectivity in the country and the region, albeit on a much smaller scale. Airport 
PPPs offer, amongst other benefits, the possibility of utilising private sector financing and 
expertise for the purpose of airport development. 
However, the opportunities for using airport PPPs in SSA countries are beset by several 
challenges. If these challenges were to be addressed by the governments in these countries, 
the risks for private parties to become involved in long-term airport concessions could be 
reduced and substantial benefits may be realised. In the interim, PPP models that allocate 
less risk to the private sector, and limit financial exposure of private parties, could also 
prove beneficial to airport development in the region. 
The following sections provide a summary of the research findings, structured along the 
research sub-questions.  
10.1. How can PPPs be used for airport development in emerging markets? 
This research has shown that PPPs can be used to develop airport infrastructure in emerging 
markets by bringing in private sector capital and expertise. In order to achieve this 
governments play a key role.  
First and foremost, governments are expected to provide an enabling environment for 
investors in airport infrastructure. This relates to a wide range of aspects collectively 
referred to as investability. Macro-economic stability that supports economic growth is 
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crucial, as GDP is considered an important driver of the air traffic from which the income of 
airports is derived. More specifically, stable, predictable and practical aviation policies and 
PPP legislation are key aspects of such an enabling environment. For successful airport PPPs 
in particular a strong and clear economic regulatory framework is required in order to 
protect airport users from monopolistic behaviour and to provide clarity and certainty 
around revenues to private participants.  
Further, if governments want to utilise PPPs for the development of their airports, they are 
expected to drive the process of procuring PPPs by setting up a realistic procurement 
process with attractive conditions and actively pursuing interested private parties.  
Airport PPPs in emerging markets can be highly lucrative investments, which is evidenced by 
substantial investor interest and high prices being offered for concessions in Brazil and India. 
Private sector parties that are interested in the potential returns offered by investments in 
airports are expected to bring a wide range of experience and expertise to the table. 
Successful airport PPPs usually require a consortium of firms to be formed. Such a 
consortium should include investors with access to sufficient capital at suitably low rates. 
Large capital outlays may be required to fund airport infrastructure upgrades and 
expansions associated with airport PPPs in emerging markets. This points towards the need 
for construction expertise in the airport PPP consortium. As airport upgrades and 
expansions can be large and complex, relevant experience is required to complete them 
cost-effectively within set timeframes.  
Successful airport concessionaires in Brazil and India have relied on a wealth of experience 
in infrastructure development and the management of complex concession agreements 
with governments. The recent airport PPP transactions in these countries have been 
dominated by large, domestic conglomerates with strong track records in infrastructure 
development and large construction projects. 
Essential to the success of airport PPPs is a consortium’s ability to operate airports 
efficiently and achieve revenue growth. The development of non-aeronautical revenue 
streams is of particular importance to growth in income and profitability. International 
airport operational experience and commercial acumen are considered vital. Airport PPPs in 
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emerging markets offer an opportunity for established international airport operators to 
expand their business beyond their home markets and diversify their sources of income. 
PPP structures used for large airports, both greenfield and brownfield, in Brazil and India 
have involved long-term concessions with required investments in infrastructure. As these 
have involved the selling off of profitable assets by governments, mechanisms have been 
included to compensate these governments. Concession fees (either fixed or revenue-
based), dividends to public shareholders in the concessionaires and contributions to airport 
infrastructure development funds (such as the FNAC in Brazil) have been used. These 
mechanisms ensure that the governments are still capable of funding unprofitable airport 
infrastructure that may serve an important role in providing connectivity. Some have argued 
that these airport PPPs have provided governments with increased revenues, as well as 
improved airport infrastructure and service levels. Furthermore, where governments are 
not able to fund the necessary improvements in airport infrastructures, airport PPPs have 
provided a way of accessing private capital. Project delivery by private sector is believed to 
be faster and more cost-effective than by public sector.  
On the other hand, there are several risks associated with private sector involvement in 
airport development. Security concerns have been expressed, relating to foreign control of 
key infrastructure and border posts. More frequently, the escalation of costs to airport users 
has been cited as a drawback of airport PPPs. This highlights the importance of economic 
regulation in the monopolistic airport environment. Other risks include over-reliance on 
private sector, skills drain from public sector and labour disputes relating to the transfer of 
operations from government to private sector. 
10.2. What are the requirements for successful airport PPPs in SSA? 
As in other emerging markets, key to successful airport PPPs in SSA are an attractive 
investor environment, stable aviation policies, effective PPP legislation and strong economic 
regulation of air services. Beyond these issues, sufficient air traffic and access to the 
necessary capital and skills are crucial. 
The level of air traffic activity in SSA countries is much lower than in the large emerging 
markets of Brazil and India, who have recently implemented a number of airport PPPs and 
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may implement more in the near the future. In 2014 there were only 21 airports in SSA that 
handled more than one million passengers, which is considered a minimum threshold for 
profitability. Further, a substantial share of the SSA air traffic is captured by South Africa, 
where the profitable airports sector is dominated by the corporatized, state-owned airports 
company ACSA. The majority of the remaining air traffic takes place in low and lower middle 
income countries with less favourable investment climates and less robust air traffic. There 
is a strong link between national (state-owned) airlines and the level of air traffic in many 
SSA countries. This poses a risk to air traffic and, therefore, the airport and airline markets 
have to be considered in unison when evaluating opportunities for airport PPPs. Strong GDP 
growth in SSA, and with it air traffic, do provide encouraging signs. 
Airport PPPs in emerging markets typically require substantial investments in upgrades and 
expansions of airport infrastructure. Therefore, access to capital at suitable rates is a 
requirement for successful airport PPPs. Such capital is preferably sourced domestically, in 
order to avoid exchange rate risks and unnecessary foreign influence over key national 
infrastructure. However, capital markets and the banking sector in many SSA countries are 
not able to support the level of investment required. As seen in Brazil and South Africa, 
(government) pension funds can play a role in financing airport PPPs. DFIs (such as the 
BNDES in Brazil) can also play a major role in providing affordable finance and supporting 
private sector investment in airports. Where foreign investment is required, the example of 
COK in India shows that innovative arrangements involving diaspora populations could 
present opportunities for countries in SSA.  
In SSA governments will have to look into ways of supporting the bankability of airport PPPs 
or utilising PPP structures that are less risky to the private sector. In some cases, private 
sector parties may require revenue guarantees and other support from government in order 
to reduce their risk exposure in long-term concessions. Alternatively, lighter forms of PPPs 
can be considered, whereby the private sector is brought in more for airport operational 
expertise and commercial acumen, than for its financial contributions. Lighter forms of PPP 
may be more suitable for the development of airports in SSA with low levels of air traffic. 
Even after implementing a number of long-term concessions, the Indian government has 
also turned to more limited airport management contracts. In general, PPP structures are 
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considered suitable when there is an appropriate sharing of risks and rewards between 
public and private sector, which is different in each country and for each airport.  
10.3. Do governments in SSA consider PPPs as suitable options for airport 
development? 
For SSA governments the main objective of using PPPs for airport development is to access 
private sector finance to fill the infrastructure funding gap that exists. Currently, 
government budget allocations are the main source of finance, but these are often not 
sufficient to realise the potential benefits of air transportation on the economy. The access 
to loans from DFIs may be limited due to the need for sovereign guarantees or due to 
prevailing government debt levels. 
However, as discussed above, the investor climate and level of air traffic in SSA may not be 
supportive of large capital investments by private sector. Long-term concession agreements 
that involve major airport upgrades and expansions could expose private sector parties to 
unacceptable levels of risk.  
In South Africa several successful airport PPPs have been implemented. However, due to the 
fact that the majority of air traffic in the country is handled at ACSA airports, there is very 
little opportunity for profitable PPPs outside that network. Proposals for greenfield airport 
PPPs have been received but none have been concluded to date. The Provincial and 
Municipal airports that currently depend on government budget allocations are not 
profitable and, therefore, unattractive to private investors. Lighter types of PPPs involving 
management concessions have been successfully implemented at a number of airports in 
the country. The government does not actively pursue airport PPPs in the country. 
Private sector finance would be welcome in Kenya to support airport developments, which 
currently rely on government budget allocations (for smaller unprofitable airports) and DFI 
loans for the two main international airports NBO and MBA. Even though the level of air 
traffic at these airports in 2014 was 6.4 MAP and 1.4 MAP respectively, airport PPPs are not 
considered bankable due to several challenges. The level of air traffic is highly dependent on 
the national airline Kenya Airways and is vulnerable to economic and external shocks. 
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Furthermore, the investor climate is such that investors would require the government to 
take on a substantial share of the risk in the PPP arrangement. 
Common challenges that are being faced by governments in SSA looking to implement PPPs 
for airport development include the investor climate, the level and growth of air traffic, the 
regulatory and policy frameworks and institutional capacity and domain expertise within 
government. 
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11. Discussion 
11.1. Relevance of the research 
The research findings clearly highlight the potential benefits of using PPPs for airport 
developments, the factors that contributed to the success of airport PPPs in other emerging 
markets and the multitude of related requirements, risks and challenges that are specific to 
the situation in SSA. These aspects provide guidance to SSA governments looking to develop 
their airport infrastructure for the benefit of connectivity and economic growth. Key areas 
for policy improvement include the quality of PPP legislation and regulation of the aviation 
industry. 
The research provides SSA governments with an understanding of the various parties 
involved in airport PPPs and their possible roles. This will enable them to target specific 
investors and ensure they acquire the experience and expertise necessary for maximising 
the benefits extracted from airport PPP deals. 
Airport investors can draw insights from this research into the aspects that affect the 
opportunities for airport PPPs in emerging markets. It allows them to better evaluate risks 
and propose mitigation measures. It also enables them to engage with host country 
governments on specific issues that affect the bankability of airport PPPs, including traffic 
risk and the regulatory system. 
11.2. Opportunities for further research 
This research is exploratory in nature and has identified a wide range of issues that are of 
importance in the development of airports in SSA and the use of PPPs specifically. Several of 
these issues require further investigation in order to develop a deeper understanding and 
arrive at valuable (policy) recommendations.  
In order for governments to set priorities and take appropriate actions, in an effort to utilise 
airport PPPs, it is important to gain a more detailed insight into the valuation and risk 
assessment methods used by airport investors. The valuation methods used can show 
where investors perceive risk, how they rate it and how they mitigate it. This insight can 
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enable governments to identify the policies and actions that can have the greatest impact 
on improving the bankability of proposed PPP structures and ultimately maximising the 
benefits derived from the PPP for all parties. 
Coupled with valuation and risk assessment are the possible sources of funding utilised by 
airport investors. More knowledge on the funds available, their costs, terms and conditions 
can enable governments to improve the bankability of airport PPPs. For example, they could 
provide benefits (such as tax breaks) in specific cases so as to increase the available funds or 
reduce their costs. Of particular interest are blended finance (i.e. utilising public funds to 
‘catalyse’ private funds), mobilising pension funds for infrastructure investment and 
diaspora finance (i.e. through instruments such as diaspora bonds).  
This leads to the wider topic of what governments can do to improve bankability of airport 
PPPs. Stiller (2010) highlights several possible options that could be explored by 
governments. The applicability of these, and other methods, may differ per country as the 
risks faced by investors will also be country-specific. A thorough comprehension of ways to 
mitigate risks and improve bankability can be beneficial to both governments and investors.  
Considering the challenges to bankability of long-term airport concessions in SSA, it would 
be worth investigating how lighter forms of PPPs can benefit airport developments. A 
multitude of PPP models is available, each with their own benefits and ways of distributing 
risk and reward between public and private sectors. It could be very beneficial to SSA 
governments to find out which models are most suitable to the low-traffic and high-risk 
environment in low and lower middle income countries. As many airports in SSA still rely 
heavily on aeronautical revenues, governments could benefit from knowledge on the 
different ways of utilising private sector expertise in the growth of non-aeronautical 
revenues.  
The privatisation of a substantial number of the countries’ largest airports in Brazil and India 
has left the government-owned airport authorities (Infraero and AAI respectively) in need of 
reorganisation. Of particular interest is the question of how governments can ensure 
sufficient funds are available to support and expand unprofitable airports, when the 
profitable ones are privatised. As described, concession fees, dividends, cross-subsidisation 
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within an airport network and mandatory contributions to infrastructure development 
funds are possibilities. However, more research is required to find the right balance 
between these, and any other possible, mechanisms. 
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Appendix A: Interview Guideline 
 
1. Introduction 
Course description: 
 Master of Management in Finance & Investment 
 1-year programme at Wits Business School 
 Research thesis 
Research objective: 
The objective of this study is to provide insight into the opportunities and limitations of PPPs 
for airport developments in Sub-Saharan Africa. It aims to provide guidance on the 
challenges and possible avenues for solutions that exist. 
Research questions: 
Can Public Private Partnerships support the development of airports in SSA? 
1. How can PPPs be used for airport development in emerging markets? 
2. What are the requirements for successful airport PPPs in SSA? 
3. Do governments in SSA consider PPPs as suitable options for airport development? 
Purpose of interviews: 
Gain insight into the views of SSA governments on PPPs for airport development: 
 Motivations and objectives 
 Objections and concerns 
 Challenges 
Practical matters: 
 One-hour interview (approximately) 
 Will be recorded and (partly) transcribed 
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 Will be included in thesis report (including position) 
 Any questions? 
2. Background 
 What are currently the sources of funding for airport developments? Budget, Offical 
Development Assistance (ODA) or private?  
 Are they considered sufficient to provide in the country’s need for airport 
infrastructure development? 
 What is the past experience with airport PPPs in the country? 
 Legislation and policy in place that deals with airport PPPs and economic regulation 
of aeronautical charges? 
 Would you consider airport privatization? Why or why not? Currently plans for 
airport PPPs in the country? 
 What are the objectives of airport privatization?  
 What would you hope to achieve with airport privatizations? 
3. Role of government  
 If you were to privatise an airport(s), what would be the preferred role of the 
government (airport authority/company) in daily operations? And in strategic 
decisions?  
 Do you consider regulation of airport (aeronautical) charges to be necessary? What 
type of regulation would be preferred or likely? Do you have particular views on 
single till versus dual or hybrid till regulations? 
4. Concession parties 
 Who would be suitable parties to participate in airport PPPs in the country?  
 What are your views on participation by foreign companies?  
 What competencies, skills or experience should private parties bring to the table? 
 Is airport operations experience an important factor? 
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5. Concession financials 
 How should the government be reimbursed for awarding a concession? Fixed fee, 
revenue/profit sharing, dividends? 
 Besides paying a fixed concession fee, what should concessionaires further 
contribute financially?  
 What are likely sources of (debt and equity) capital for private parties to fund 
concession fees and airport upgrades? Are domestic sources (local currency) 
available? Or is foreign capital required? 
 What role can multilateral development finance institutions play? 
 Do you believe that airport PPPs in the country could be bankable for the private 
sector?  
 What can the government do to improve bankability? 
 If (large) profitable airports are privatised, would that impact the government 
(airport authority/company) revenue stream? How would that affect the 
maintenance and upgrade of (small) non-profitable airports?  
6. GDP and air traffic 
 What is the outlook for growth in GDP and air traffic in the country? 
 Is the level of air traffic at airport(s) in the country sufficient for private investors to 
be interested in PPPs? Is air traffic growth sufficient?  
 Do you see the level of air traffic, and its growth, as an opportunity or a limiting 
factor? 
7. Closing 
 What do you see as obstacles/challenges/limitations in the implementation of 
airport PPPs in the country? 
 Do you see a role for PPPs in airport development in the country? In other countries 
in the region? In Sub-Saharan Africa? 
 Any other comments or thoughts on the matter? 
 Word of thanks.   
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Appendix B: Content Analysis Coding Tree 
 
1. Attribute codes 
No. Code Sub-code 
1 Income level 
Upper middle income (UMI) 
Lower middle income (LMI) 
2 Region 
Southern Africa 
East Africa 
3 GDP Growth (CAGR last decade) 
≈ 3% 
≈ 5% 
4 Traffic Growth (CAGR last decade) 
≈ 2% 
≈ 4% 
5 Medium airports (>1 MAP) 
2 
5 
6 Experience with PPP 
National 
Regional 
 
2. Substantive codes 
No. Code Sub-code 
1 Financing 
Budget 
ODA 
Private 
Sufficient 
Gap 
2 Role of government 
Regulator 
Financier 
Initiator 
Policy 
Capacity 
3 Concession parties 
Foreign 
Domestic 
Operator 
Investor 
4 PPP Structure 
Light 
Long-term concession 
5 Precedent 
In airports 
In other sectors 
6 Investability 
Policy 
Macro-economic 
Legal protection 
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7 Risk 
Traffic 
Economic 
To government 
8 Challenge 
Institutional capacity 
Bureaucracy 
9 Benefits 
Efficiency 
Non-aeronautical 
Funding 
 
 
 
 
 
 
